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PREFACE
Skylab was the most comprehensive manned space program completed
to date, involving unprecedented numbers of experiments, government
agencies, contractors and supporting personnel. Ninety-four experiments,
plus several experimental operational instruments and twenty-six science
demonstrations, were developed, integrated with Skylab,-,and flown. A
majority of these were individual experiments, although some (e.g.,
earth resources and space materials processing experiments) were associ-
ated with discipline-oriented facilities provided for scientific users
by Skylab. Experiment data gathered aboard Skylab was supplied to over
two hundred and fifty scientists from the United States and nineteen
other countries.
The many interfaces involved in the development and integration
of these experiments imposed new burdens upon the "standard" methods
and techniques that had evolved from earlier space programs. As a
result, many changes were made, and many lessons learned, throughout
the course of the Skylab Program. For example, new types of documen-
tation were established, design review and configuration management
techniques were improved and mission support activities took on new
dimensions. This Experimenters' Reference records the Skylab experience
in experiment management, including lessons learned and recommendations
for improved cost-effectiveness, to facilitate the transfer of this
knowledge to experimenters in future manned space programs.
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DEFINITIONS
Acceptance - An official act by the Experiment Development Center to
accept transfer of accountability, title, and delivery of an end-item
of hardware or software, whether procured on contract or in-house.
Acceptance Test - The formal assessment or testing accomplished in
accordance with Part II of an end item specification to verify the
performance, configuration, and manufacture of an end item (1) at the
time of its delivery and acceptance by the Government, or (2) for
delivery to another NASA Center.
Activation - The activities associated with originally placing an
orbital vehicle or ground facility in operational condition.
Baseline - An approved and defined technical description providing a
point of departure for control of future changes.
Cluster - The orbital assembly constituting the complete configuration
for manned Skylab missions, including all modules of the unmanned
laboratory plus a docked Command and Service Module.
Crew Compartment Fit and Function (C2F2) -One of the'final check-
outs performed during hardware integration. Flight crew members in-
spect the carrier for proper hardware integration, accessibility, and
safety considerations.
Delivery - The physical transfer of hardware from one site to another.
Includes transfer of responsibility for hardware custodianship (also
see Acceptance).
End Item - An article of hardware or software which is deliverable by
NASA or a contractor as a complete item as identified, defined and
scheduled.
Experiment - A part of the payload devoted to the investigation of
scientific or engineering phenomena. Sometimes used as synonymous
with instrument; however, instrument generally refers only to the
operating flight hardware, whereas experiment refers to the combina-
tion of all associated hardware plus the use of the data to satisfy an
objective.
Ground Support Equipment 
- Special ~pquipment required for-servicinq,L.,:
testing, handling,, maintaining, and/or transporting:the eKperiment a
hardware during ground operations.
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High-Fidelity Mockup - Training hardware that is essentially identical
to flight hardware in size, shape, and appearance and provides crew
interfaces (switches, etc.) but need not be operational.
Instrument - An item of hardware designed to perform a specific scientific
or engineering function in support of an experiment objective (also see
Experiment).
Interface - A region common to two or more elements, systems, projects
or programs and characterized by mutual physical, functional, environ-
mental, operational, and/or procedural properties.
Integration - Activities that are performed to assure physical and
functional compatibility of an experiment with other experiments, the
module, and the overall mission. Also the physical mating and testing
of a combined system (e.g. module and experiments).
Mission - A single spaceflight from launch to landing, and its objectives.
Module - A major element of the payload or spacecraft, which carries
experiments and support systems designed to meet mission objectives.
Near-Real Time - A short period of time, (normally within 24 hours)
after actual occurrence of a mission event.
Open Item - A question or problem which is unresolved, and requires
action to ensure its resolution.
Orbital Facility - A group of instruments designed to investigate vari-
ous parameters of a common subject or discipline.
Qualification - Determination that an article or material is capable
of meeting all design and performance requirements established for the
item. An item can be qualified by test, by analysis, or by similarity
to a qualified item.
Single Failure Point - A single item of hardware having an independent fail-
ure mode which would result in the functional loss of a system. Examples
are nonredundant valves, regulators, pumps, motors, switches, relays,
transistors, resistors, diodes, or a single path of passive electrical
hardware (e.g., wiring, solder joint, connectors, etc.) that could open or
short circuit.
Waiver - A written authorization to accept an end-item or other designated
item which, during manufacture or after having been submitted for inspec-
tion, is found to depart from specified requirements but is considered
suitable for use "as is" or after rework by an approved method.
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NONSTANDARD ABBREVIATIONS
ADP Acceptance Data Package
CCB Configuration Control Board
CCBD Configuration Control Board Directive
C2F 2  Crew Compartment Fit and Function
CDR Critical Design Review
CIL Critical Items List
CIR Configuration Inspection Review
COFW Certificate of Flight Worthiness
CRS Cluster Requirements Specification
DCR Design Certification Review
DRF Data Request Form
ECP Engineering Change Proposal
ECR Engineering Change Request
ED Experiment Developer
EDC Experiment Development Center
EGS Experiment General Specification
EHGRD Experiment Hardware General Requirements Document
EIC Experiment Integration Center
EIP Experiment Implementation Plan
EIS End Item Specification
EITRS Experiment Integration Test Requirements and Specifications
EOP Experiment Operations Planning
viii
ERD Experiment Requirements Document
EVA Extravehicular Activity
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
FRR Flight Readiness Review
GSE Ground Support Equipment
ICD Interface Control Document
MCC Mission Control Center
MRB Material Review Board
MRD Mission Requirements Document
MSFEB Manned Space Flight Experiments Board
OMSF Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA Headquarters
OM&H Operation, Maintenance and Handling Procedures
PATRS Post-Acceptance Test Requirements and Specifications
PDR Preliminary Design Review
PI Principal Investigator
PRR Preliminary Requirements Review
IP Reference Flight-Plan '
RID Review Item Discrepancy
SCN Specification'Change Notice
SOCAR Systems/Operations Compatibility Assessment Review
SPO Sponsoring Program Office
TCRSD Test and Checkout Requirements and Specifications
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SECTION I. INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose
This document is intended to familiarize prospective partici-
pants in future manned space programs with the methods and techniques
for experiment development and integration that evolved during the
Skylab Program. Future programs may not adopt identical procedures,
but insight into the Skylab experience, including the lessons learned,
will be of value as a reference for scientific investigators, experi-
ment developers, and integrators who face similar tasks in the future.
B. Scope
The Experimenter's Reference outlines the full spectrum of
experiment-related responsibilities, activities and events as they
were planned and executed in the Skylab Program. The planning and
the execution sometimes varied; exceptions and variations were common
as the program developed. This is not a history of such deviations,
but rather a compilation of those methods and techniques which experi-
ence proved to be most effective for Skylab.
The major activities and events that involve experiments, and
their interrelationships, are illustrated in functional flow charts
for the overall program and for each of its major phases. An over-
view is given of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) management roles and responsibilities. The alternative
approaches of providing single experiments for individual investiga-
tors, versus a multi-instrument orbital facility with many "users,"
are discussed. The evolution of the experiment and its hardware,
and their integration with Skylab, are traced from initial concept
through delivery, integration testing, mission operations, data analy-
sis and reports. Configuration control and the influence of special
disciplines (safety, reliability, maintainability, quality assurance
etc.) are separately treated. Public relations aspects are also
discussed. Skylab lessons learned are incorporated in the form of
specific "Recommendations", interspersed at appropriate points through-
out the text. (Additional lessons learned across all program discip-
lines, as compiled by NASA Headquarters and the various NASA centers,
may be found in References 1 through 4.)
The main text is intentionally concise. Additional details,
where considered appropriate, are provided in separate appendices.
For example, major experiment-related documents referred to through-
out the text are described in detail in Appendix A.
C. Program General Flow
The general functional flow of activities and events that
involved an experiment followed a fairly standardized pattern
(figure 1), whether for an individual experiment or for an instrument
forming part of a facility. Distinct program phases, as identified
in figure 1, are amplified in sections III through VIII; activities
which extended through many.phases of the program are.discussed
separately in sections II and IX through XI and in Appendix B. A
second-level flow for each major program phase is included at the
beginning of the applicable section to illustrate the relationships
of activities discussed within that section. A "waterfall" chart of
experiment program elements (figure 2) depicts the overall Skylab
experiment program in greater detail.
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FIGURE 2. EXPERIMENT-RELATED PROGRAM ELEMENTS
SECTION II. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
In general, management systems and techniques employed by NASA for
the Skylab Program were outgrowths from those developed on previous man-
ned space programs. They naturally evolved and changed during Skylab;
further variations can be anticipated to accommodate the unique require-
ments of future programs. In recognition of this fact, an effort has
been made to identify the necessary management functions in a general
way, regardless of who may be assigned to carry them out.
The areas of general responsibility for a space experiment pro-
gram are: 1) program direction, 2) hardware development, 3) integration,
4) launch operations, 5) mission operations, and 6) analysis ahd report-
ing. For Skylab, NASA Headquarters retained the program direction respon-
sibility, and delegated the other roles to individual NASA centers.
RECOMMENDATION: At the outset of a program, publish and
enforce clearly defined intercenter and intracenter author-
ities and responsibilities for all program elements.
A. Program Direction
NASA Headquarters provided the initial planning and the top-level
direction for all program aspects. A Headquarters Program Office (the
Skylab Program Director and a limited staff) exercised this management
role by means of guidelines and directives to the NASA Center Program
Managers, and overall control of funds and schedules. Major decisions
involving program and mission objectives, experiment selections and
flight assignments, funding, and milestone schedules were made by Head-
quarters, with due consideration for inputs from the appropriate centers.
Various offices at Headquarters served as Sponsoring Program Offices
(SPO) for individual Skylab experiments (see Section III B). A Manned
Space Flight Experiments Board (MSFEB), composed of representatives of
various NASA and Department of Defense organizations, performed a con-
tinuing advisory function for the Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight, relative to major experiment decisions. (MSFEB c.ered not
only Skylab, but all current and contemplated manned space flight exper-
iment programs.)
B. Hardware Development Centers
Each major group of associated hardware end items (e.g., an ex-
periment or module)"'.was assigned to an appropriate NASA center for
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
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development. Any existing center could be selected, depending on the
nature of the end items and center capabilities.
1. Experiment Development Center. The Experiment Development
Center (EDC) was responsible for management of the design, development,
testing, fabrication, qualification and delivery of the basic instrument,
supporting hardware and experiment-peculiar ground support equipment (GSE).
Following delivery, the EDC monitored experiment performance and provided
technical consultation to the module development and operational centers
throughout postacceptance testing and mission operations. In many cases
the EDC utilized a development contractor to augment its capabilities.
The organization (government or contractor) that actually produced the
experiment hardware was referred to as the Experiment Developer (ED).
EDCs for Skylab experiments included: George C. Marshall Space Flight
Center (MSFC), Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC), Ames Research
Center (ARC), and Langley Research Center (LaRC). Other government
agencies, including the Department of Transportation, the United States
Air Force, and the Naval Research Laboratory, performed the EDC functions
for certain experiments. Specific NASA centers were assigned to work
with these organizations, acting as "proxy" EDCs to eliminate any
potential difficulties due to management and reporting technique varia-
tions utilized by different government agencies.
2. Module Development Center. The Module Development Center
had the same responsibilities relative to the module that the EDC had
for the experiment. In addition, the module development center managed
the installation and integration testing of the experiment hardware prior
to module delivery. The actual hardware was developed by contractors
under the direction of the center project offices. JSC was the Command
and Service Module development center and MSFC was the development center
for the other Skylab modules.
C. Integration Center
This center was responsible for overall Skylab systems engineer-
ing and integration, which included managing experiment interfaces with
the total program. The Integration Center maintained a continuing com-
patibility assessment to assure that all experiments under its cognizance
were designed, fabricated, tested and operated in complete compatibility
with all program and experiment requirements; it also participated in the
resolution of interface problems that arose. MSFC was the Integration
Center for Skylab and utilized the supporting services of a Systems Engi-
neering and Integration Contractor.
In general, experiment integration responsibility was assigned to
the center developing the module that would carry the experiment. Thus
MSFC was also the Experiment Integration Center (EIC) for all Skylab
flight experiments except those in the JSC-developed Command and Service
Module, or crew procedural experiments involving no special hardware.
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D. Launch Operations Center
This center received the integrated modules and launch vehicle
stages and performed final assembly, test and closeout to ensure that
the integrated system was ready for launch. The minimum requirements
for the final integrated systems test were provided by the Integration
Center to the Launch Operations Center. Launch was controlled from this
center through countdown and liftoff. Following liftoff, control of the
mission shifted to the Mission Operations Center. The John F. Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) was the Launch Operations Center for Skylab.
E. Mission Operations Center
This center was responsible for controlling the mission to
ensure that mission objectives were satisfied. Prior to launch, this
center provided crew training and prepared flight planning and mission
operations documentation. After launch it controlled the mission by
monitoring all systems and updating preplanned crew activities as
required. This center was also responsible for recovery operations
and data dissemination (see Sections VII and VIII). The Skylab Mission
Operations Center was JSC.
F. Cost and Schedule Control
Cost and schedule considerations were an important factor in
selecting the experiments and continuing them in the program. Intense
management scrutiny was brought to bear on those experiments that had
repeated overruns of estimated costs or delays in meeting established
milestones, which in turn added cost.
The NASA Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF), through the
Skylab Program Office at Headquarters, exercised overall control of
Skylab budgets, costs and milestone event schedules. A Program
Operating Plan (POP), compiled and maintained at Headquarters,
reflected experiment resources commitments as originally approved in
the Experiment Implementation Plan and subsequently revised by approval
of inputs submitted by the cognizant centers. The POP was the 'authori-
tative summary of program funding and schedules.
RECOMMENDATION: Prior to approval of an experiment for
development, insist upon sufficient definition to pro-
vide realistic estimates of cost ceilings. For this
purpose, final approval might be withheld until after
Preliminary Design Review; or funding could be reviewed
and approved in incremental stages.
SECTION III. EXPERIMENT DEFINITION
Experiments proposed for the Skylab Program varied from new in-
vestigations to reflight of experiments from other programs. Some,
developed during previous programs, had flight hardware already avail-
able, while others were only concepts and their hardware designs had not
yet begun. The selection process, (see figure 3) was designed to en-
sure that experiments approved for Skylab had been thoroughly evaluated
on the basis of scientific merit and compatibility with the program's
objectives, capabilities, schedules and funding. The current (post-
Skylab) NASA selection process is described in detail in Reference 5,
and reflects the Skylab experience.
A. Conceptual Approaches
Skylab experiment concepts were generated and implemented by
either of two approaches. Where an individual scientist conceived an
acceptable investigation of a specific scientific objective, a single
experiment was generally developed to satisfy that objective, and the
originating scientist was identified as the Principal Investigator (PI).
Most of the experiments were generated in this way. The other approach
(which gained increasing favor during the Skylab Program) was that of
implementing an "Orbital Experiment Facility", comprising a group of
associated instruments dedicated to general investigations of a parti-
cular scientific discipline, such as earth resources or materials pro-
cessing in space. Facility instruments were generally conceived by a
small group or committee of scientists versed in the needs of the dis-
cipline involved. When the facility concept or preliminary design had
progressed to the point where its capabilities were reasonably well
defined, an Announcement of Flight Opportunity (AFO) was issued to
potential "users" throughout the world. Interested scientists responded
with proposals for using the facility to gather data for their specific
investigations. Accepted proposals were contractually implemented with
the users by the EDC. A NASA Project Scientist at the EDC performed the
PI functions (and represented the users) for each facility instrument.
The chief advantages of the facility approach are: much broader usage
of the instruments and data, and the fact that all the user scientists
need not be directly involved during the full program duration.
B. Sponsoring Program Office
Each experiment required a Sponsoring Program Office to manage
the conceptual identification and feasibility phase of the experiment
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FIGURE 3. EXPERIMENT DEFINITION
definition. For Skylab, the NASA sponsoring offices were the Office of
Manned Space Flight (OMSF), the Office of Space Science Applications
(OSSA), and the Office of Advanced Research and Technology (OART). The
Department of Defense (DOD) also served as sponsoring office for certain
experiments. The experiment's scientific discipline generally determined
the cognizant SPO.
Having received and concurred with the scientist's conceptual
proposal, the SPO formally presented it to the MSFEB for preliminary
consideration, and later for final approval. The SPO subsequently
monitored the scientific and technical integrity of approved experi-
ments through all program phases to ensure that experiment objectives
were satisfied, and that adequate funding was provided.
C. Approval Cycle
Once an experiment was recommended by the MSFEB for considera-
tion, an Experiment Implementation Plan (EIP) was prepared and a com-
patibility assessment made.
1. Experiment Implementation Plan. The PI and the designated
EDC jointly compiled experiment information in an EIP in as much detail
as possible. In addition to the experiment objectives, the EIP generally
included preliminary information for the design, fabrication, test and
delivery of experiment equipment, and the operating procedures necessary
to perform the experiment. An experiment development schedule and
estimated funding (resources) requirements were also included. Experi-
ment development and delivery schedules as required in the EIP were
necessarily keyed to overall program-controlled milestones and module
level development and test schedules. Requirements identified in the
EIP were concurrently utilized by the Integration Center in performing
the compatibility assessment.
2. Compatibility Assessment. This study compared the experi-
ment's interface requirements with the program's existing capabilities
and constraints. Where incompatibilities were found, solutions or
alternate designs were proposed that would satisfy the experiment
objectives without unacceptable impact to the program. At this early
stage, the compatibility assessment was necessarily less detailed than
that described in Appendix B, but approached it as nearly as the pre-
liminary information would permit. Normally, the Integration Center
conducted this analysis, with support from the PI, the EDC, and the
operating centers as required.
3. Final Review and Approval. The experiment proposal,
supplemnLd by the EIP and compatibility assessment, was then resub-
mitted to the MSFEB for its review and recommendation. The NASA
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Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight (who also chaired the
MSFEB) made the final decision on approval of the experiment for im-
plementation.
RECOMMENDATION: Emphasize thoroughness in preparation of
the EIP and conduct of the compatibility assessment during
the initial experiment approval cycle, for early identifi-
cation of all program impacts and any major problem areas.
D. Generation of Requirements
Upon final approval, two types of experiment requirements 
were
generated: the design requirements for the scientific 
instrument
development and the integration requirements to support the experiment
during all phases of the program. The former were stated in a document
called the End Item Specification (EIS) and the latter were identified
in an Experiment Requirements Document (ERD). Both of these documents
were the responsibility of the EDC; however, the ERD required EIC and
operations center support and in some cases was actually prepared 
by
the EIC. [NOTE: Occasionally, in the early stages, the descriptive
portions of the ERD were used as a substitute for the preliminary EIS,
but this procedure was generally concluded to be less than satisfactory]
RECOMMENDATION: Initiate preparation of the EIS and ERD as
soon as possible after experiment approval. Since the ERD
is an integration document, primarily concerned with pro-
gram-wide interfaces, it should be prepared and maintained
by the EIC, with support and concurrence from the EDC.
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SECTION IV. EXPERIMENT DEVELOPMENT
Upon program approval of the experiment, the hardware development
proceeded. A series of reviews was held and development and qualifica-
tion tests performed (see figure 4), to ensure the satisfaction of design
and interface requirements. The same sequence of reviews and tests was
imposed on all experiments regardless of the hardware development status
when approved for Skylab. In general, new tests were waived only when
it could be demonstrated that previous tests had met or exceeded the
Skylab requirements.
Detailed requirements and procedures for the various development
reviews are described in Appendix C. Appendix D presents a listing of
specific considerations and constraints pertinent to experiment design.
An overview of the total experiment testing program is provided in
Appendix E.
A. Requirements Baseline
A formal Preliminary Requirements Review (PRR) was conducted by
the EDC at the earliest practical date after experiment approval and ED
selection. The purpose of the PRR was to verify all requirements that
had to be met to satisfy the experiment objectives, as stated in the
preliminary EIS and ERD. The PRR was intended to establish as a require-
ment baseline: a preliminary EIS which properly specified experiment
requirements in terms of performance criteria and limits; an ERD which
properly specified experiment interface requirements on the module, crew,
launch, flight and recovery operations; the number of required end
items (i.e., flight, backup, test and training units, mock-ups) and their
schedules; and the development program plan.
RECOMMENDATION: Involve operations personnel to help
identify, assess and resolve the impacts of operational
requirements upon experiment design (and vice versa)
at thi earliest possible stage of development, to permit
tradeoffs for the efficient use of crew time and space-
craft capabilities during the mission. Consider the
feasibility of unattended or ground-controlled operation
for repetitive or time-consuming functions that do not
require onboard crew judgment. Minimize experiment
impacts on concurrent spacecraft activities.
B. Experiment Design
Implementation of the EIS requirements into hardware design
was accomplished in two phases: the design approach, approved at
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the Preliminary Design'Review (PDR); and the detail design, approved
at the Critical Design Review (CDR).
Development activities leading up to the PDR were to: 1) accom-
plish hardware preliminary design (subsystem block diagrams, overall
dimensions, etc.), based upon the technical requirements of the base-
lined EIS; 2) perform trade studies to evaluate alternate concepts for
subsystems, consistent with the experiment PRR; 3) perform the develop-
ment activities that verify new subsystems, manufacturing processes,
logic design, etc.; 4) define EIS requirements for the GSE; and 5) prepare
reliability, quality control, maintainability and safety requirements
sections for the experiment EIS.
RECOMMENDATION: Conduct necessary trade studies between
scientifically desirable and technically achievable
requirements (e.g., pointing tolerances) as early as
possible in the development process, to avoid-downstream
incompatibilities.
The PDR was then conducted by the EDC, wherein a design approach
was selected to proceed to final design of flight hardware. The experi-
ment PDR objectives were to: 1) approve the selected design approach
for the flight hardware; 2) evaluate the justification for the.design
approach shown (by trade studies, technical reports, and/or development
tests); 3) approve the technical requirements for mock-ups and GSE as
stated in EISs for these articles; 4) review the adequacy of preliminary
Interface Control Documents (ICDs) provided by the Module Development
Center (see Section V); 5) approve the verification plan for the
selected design; 6) approve producibility of the hardware; and 7) approve
the completed flight hardware EIS with plans for quality, reliability,
safety, and maintainability.
Following PDR, the experiment design proceeded to completion.
Final detailed schematics and drawings of all parts were based upon the
EIS, ICDs, and the approved design approach from the PDR. Appendix D
lists a number of specific considerations that were recognized in the
detail design of Skylab flight hardware and GSE.
RECOMMENDATIONS: In addition to the detailed design con-
siderations recommended in Appendix D, the following
general design philosophy criteria are particularly
emphasized:
o Carefully evaluate the cost-effectiveness of using
existing hardware for new programs.
14
o Build in safety features (e.g., interlocks, limit
switches, etc.) to protect the hardware and/or
enhance serviceability.
o Standardize crew interface hardware.
o Emphasize simplicity of operation as a primary design
objective (e.g., avoid multiple switching operations
that would permit selection of invalid modes or require
time delays to preclude logic race conditions).
o Design manned spaceflight hardware to facilitate
in-flight maintenance (e.g., provide accessibility
and suitable workstations with restraint aids for
crewmen, documents,small parts and tools).
o Provide telemetry or crew status indicators that give
direct readout of specific parameters needed for in-
flight assessment of experiment operation or for
troubleshooting hardware malfunctions.
o Ensure existence of capability for in-flight visual
observation of external experiments.
During this phase, the qualification and acceptance test
specifications were prepared, based upon limits in the EIS and pre-
liminary ICDs. A development (prototype) unit was usually fabricated
and used for development tests of new design, data system, unusual
manufacturing processes, etc., and for crew training.
The design was then reviewed for compatibility with require-
ments at the experiment CDR. The CDR results were: baselining of
the approved detail design of the flight hardware, qualification unit,
and GSE for release to manufacturing; approval of qualification and
acceptance test specifications; approval of test and manufacturing
facilities; and a review of development test results to certify that
design and manufacturing would involve minimum risk.
RECOMMENDATION: Baselined experiment design should not be
dependent on unproven advanced state-of-the-art features.
Resist product improvement type changes after baselining,
unless they clearly enhance the probability of mission
success and/or improve cost-effectiveness.
15
C. Fabrication and Test
Using drawings approved at CDR, fabrication activities began.
The number of hardware units fabricated was a variable, generally
depending upon the experiment's complexity, schedule and budget.
In addition to the previously mentioned development prototype and the
flight unit, there was normally a flight backup unit, a qualification
test unit and various training units, simulators and mock-ups. (In
some cases, to minimize cost, it was found acceptable to reuse the
same hardware for more than one of these applications.) The qualifica-
tion unit, flight unit, and backup unit or spare parts were all built
and assembled to the same design drawings.
RECOMMENDATION: Carefully evaluate the need for multiple
hardware, trading off the apparent cost against the risk
of needing additional hardware too late in the program
to produce it without excessive cost or delay.
At the earliest possible date, the qualification unit was fabri-
cated and subjected to qualification tests, to verify that the design
was compatible with specified environments. Whenever the qualification
unit failed a test, corrective action was taken. If this involved a
new design or a modification to the qualification unit, it was necessary
that the new design or modification be incorporated into the flight and
backup units.
The flight unit was subjected to an acceptance test, usually at
levels less severe than the qualification test but adequate to verify
conformance to the design requirements of the EIS.
During this phase also, the EDC and ED participated in meetings
with the Integration, Module Development, and Launch Operations Centers
to establish the test requirements for postacceptance integration test-
ing (see Section V.C).
RECOMMENDATIONS: Supplementing the details in Appendix E,
the following recommendations apply to experiment testing
Ln general:
o Provlde experiment hardware and perform testing in
the logical order (i.e., have the development
unit available early in the program, and complete
development and qualification testing prior to
flight hardware acceptance).
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o Emphasize early identification and timely baselining
of test and GSE requirements and responsibilities -
preferably as early as PDR. Minimize configuration
variations in GSE sets to be used for identical tests
at different test sites.
o Utilize a team of test/experiment integration specialists
to develop appropriate integration test plans and
requirements.
o Place more reliance on experiment development, quali-
fication and acceptance test results to reduce
integrated testing.
o Consider the cost-effectiveness of using interface
simulators to minimize interface verification tests
at the module level, and to preclude premature
experiment hardware delivery.
o Support all experiment testing, both preacceptance
and postacceptance, with cognizant experiment
development and integration personnel for timely
problem identification and corrective action.
D. Acceptance and Delivery
Following fabrication and test, a Configuration Inspection Re-
view (CIR) was held to verify that the flight hardware to be accepted by
the EDC conformed to the approved design configuration. Qualification
and acceptance test results were assessed for validity and conformance
to requirements. The CIR also verified that the Acceptance Data Package
(ADP) was complete and that problems which occurred after CDR had
been properly resolved. The ADP provided a complete set of descrip-
tive data for each deliverable end item, which was maintained current and
physically accompanied the hardware when shipped from site to site.
Appendix A includes a full description of the ADP contents. A DD250
(a NASA form for formal acceptance of the hardware), indicating any
shortages or open work items to be resolved prior to Flight Readiness
Review, was approved by the EDC at the completion of the CIR. Prior to
shipment from the point of manufacture, a Certificate of Flight Worthi-
ness (COFW) was prepared and endorsed by the EDC representative (see
Appendix C).
RECOMMENDATION: Define a standard list of minimum
necessary ADP requirements, acceptable to all centers
involved, and implement it contractually on all hardware
developers.
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E. Late Experiment Additions
The value of the Skylab missions was considerably enhanced by
approval, late in the program, of many new experiments (e.g., the
Multipurpose Electric Furnace, the Student Experiments, and the Comet
Kohoutek Observing Program). To develop these experiments without
impacting launch dates required an expedited approach to the methodology
just described. One aspect of this approach was the use of a specialist
team to prepare major experiment development documentation. Integration
personnel, already familiar with the interfacing module systems and with
Skylab documentation requirements, were assigned to assist the EDs in
preparing such documents as the EIS; Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA); Hazards Analyses; Operation, Maintenance and Handling (OM&H)
procedures; Materials List; etc. The results were timely, complete,
consistent and correctly formatted documents, prepared at minimal cost.
RECOMMENDATION: Expand upon the Skylab usage of specialist
teams for preparation of major experiment development docu-
mentation, to preclude each developer having to go through
his own learning cycle. Consider using similar teams for
experiment-related integration documentation as well.
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SECTION V. EXPERIMENT INTEGRATION WITH THE MODULE
Development of the modules that carried the experiments proceeded
in parallel with the experiment development, as indicated in figure 1.
The modules followed a similar pattern of design reviews, fabrication and
testing. In addition, however, experiment installation and integration
testing were performed prior to final module acceptance and delivery to
the launch site (see figure 5).
A. Module Requirements Baseline
A PRR was conducted by the Module Development Center to baseline
the technical requirements for the module. The mission and total orbital
assembly (cluster) requirements were reviewed (e.g., mission orbital
parameters and durations, module descriptions and interface requirements,
experiment assignments to modules, control weight allocations, power
profiles, pointing requirements, natural and induced design environments,
etc.). [NOTE: As the program progressed, the need was recognized for
a separate specification identifying these overall system requirements
imposed at the cluster level. An intercenter Cluster Requirements Speci-
fication (CRS) was accordingly implemented, and became, in effect, the
top-level End Item SpecificationJ Experiment requirements identified
in the ERDs, current compatibility assessments and integration plans and
schedules were also reviewed at PRR. These activities, together with
completion of any PRR action items, established the program requirements
baseline for the module.
RECOMMENDATION: Early in any new program (preferably prior
to module and experiment PRRs) establish and baseline the
equivalent of the Skylab Cluster Requirements Specification
and impose it upon all program elements, to ensure program-
wide compatibility with overall requirements (e.g., opera-
tional environments). At module PRR, formalize the module
requirements baseline in a preliminary module EIS.
B. Module Design and Integration
The module design and integration proceeded in parallel with
the experiment development activities (see Section IV). Module develop-
ment activities included: 1) the basic analysis and design to meet
module requirements; 2) developing preliminary experiment ICDs for use
in the experiments' final design, including definition of the module
technical inputs (e.g., dynamic and static loads, number and type of
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FIGURE 5. EXPERIMENT INTEGRATION WITH THE MODULE
electrical connectors, power level, voltages, etc.); 3) a continuing
compatibility assessment to show status of design conformance to re-
quirements and to provide management visibility of problems; 4) pro-
viding overall module system block diagrams; 5) defining GSE require-
ments; and 6) establishing subsystem add-ons (batteries, propellant,
etc.) to satisfy mission requirements.
A module PDR was held to baseline the preliminary module design
and the integration approach. The preliminary EIS and block diagrams,
drawings, matrices, etc., of each subsystem were reviewed to show con-
formance to technical requirements of the CRS. The technical adequacy
of the module design, ICDs, module FMEA, GSE requirements, an updated
integration plan, schedules and compatibility assessments were also
reviewed.
Final module detail design and integration was then started,
utilizing the PDR baseline. This involved: 1) preparing engineering
drawings of all parts and assemblies, detail schematics, wiring dia-
grams, etc.; 2) building of a high-fidelity mock-up of the integrated
system for review at the CDR; 3) the detail design of all module-provided
GSE; 4) preparation of manufacturing and assembly plans and drawings;
5) preparation of qualification and acceptance test specifications;
6) completion of the module development program (cable layouts, struc-
tural vibration, etc.) to support final design; and 7) fabrication of
mechanical interface GSE (provided to some experiment developers prior
to delivery of flight experiments for verification of interfaces dur-
ing their acceptance testing).
The module CDR occurred after the majority of the experiment CDRs.
Review items included: 1) analyses that supported the design; 2) de-
tail drawings and plans; 3) the module FMEA; 4) module qualification
and acceptance test specifications; 5) mock-ups; and 6) ICDs. The
CDR baselined the final design configuration of the module.
C. Integration Test Requirements and Procedures
During the final phase of experiment development, the Module
Development Center/contractor made preparations for receipt of the
experiments and for the assembly and testing of the module subassemblies.
In testing the module, experiment electrical simulators (built by ex-
periment developers) were sometimes used in place of actual hardware.
This provided confidence in the design and eliminated many problems
prior to flight unit delivery. Special Post-Acceptance Test Require-
ments and Specifications (PATRS) meetings were held with each EDC/ED
and the Integration and Launch Operations Centers, to develop experiment
requirements and criteria inputs for the module/experiment integration
tests and related portions of the integrated systems..tes.ts at the launch
site. The output of these meetings was a coordinated Experiment Integra-
tion Test Requirements and Specifications (EITRS) document, prepared by the
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Integration Center and concurred with by all other centers and contractors
involved. The Module Development Center then compiled these requirements
and limits into a Test and Checkout Requirements and Specifications Docu-
ment (TCRSD) for the module, from which the detailed experiment integra-
tion test procedures* were subsequently prepared by the center responsible
for conducting the tests.
RECOMMENDATION: Baseline EITRS documents for the various
experiments and module TCRSDs (or equivalents) as early
as possible, and maintain at least the TCRSDs under Level
II change control, to ensure clear and complete definition
of integration test requirements for all program elements,
Maintain uniformity of procedures for performing identical
tests at different test sites.
D. Physical Integration, Acceptance and Delivery
The module now entered the final acceptance phase prior to
delivery to the launch site. Upon receipt of each experiment at the
module site, it was subjected to an unpowered receiving and inspection
test for transportation damage and completeness of parts and documenta-
tion. The hardware was then installed in the module, using module
assembly drawings and the experiment OM&H. A powered functional inter-
face verification (FIV) test of the experiment with the module was per-
formed to verify that all electrical and mechanical interfaces conformed
to the specifications in the TCRSD. Following FIV tests for all exper-
iments, a simulated mission test was conducted for the integrated system.
Some flight crewmen generally participated in this system test as part
of their crew training.
RECOMMENDATION: Encourage participation in experiment/
module integration tests by all flight crewmen who may be
required to operate the experiment during the mission(s).
Upon successful completion of all testing, a module CIR was held.
The integrated system test results were reviewed to verify that the
module had met the established requirements. A module DD250 and COFW
were executed by NASA, and the integrated module was then shipped to the
launch site. Any experiment or subsystem that was removed for separate
shipment needed interface reverification at the launch site when it was
reinstalled. Experiments that were returned to the developer for modi-
fication or final calibration prior to shipment to the launch site
required an additional endorsement on their DD250 and COFW by the EDC.
* If flight checklists (see Section VII) were available from the Mission
Operations Center, these test procedures followed the checklists as
closely as possible.
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RECOMMENDATION: Discourage removal of experiments after
module integration and acceptance. When this is unavoid-
able, emphasize critical configuration control and main-
tenance of appropriate records by all parties involved.
E. Continuing Compatibility Assessment
The evolution of the experiment concepts and module designs to
hardware was supported throughout by a continuing compatibility assess-
ment, conducted by the Integration Center. This assessment monitored
the experiment interfaces with the program for compatibility, proposed
and coordinated solutions to experiment incompatibility problems, and
provided management visibility of the experiment integration status.
Further details of this activity are provided in Appendix B.
RECOMMENDATION: Follow the Skylab practice of utilizing a
highly-qualified, specialized experiment integration team.
Assign responsibility for each experiment (or group of
related experiments, depending upon complexity) to an indi-
vidual engineer, to act as the single-point source for com-
piling and disseminating experiment requirements and other
integration information. Assign responsibility for com-
patibility of experiments with each carrier system or
program discipline to an individual systems engineer, to
facilitate experiment liaison with other project groups.
Conduct continuous compatibility assessment and frequent
reviews throughout the development and integration phases,
providing timely management visibility of problem status.
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SECTION VI. PRELAUNCH INTEGRATION AND LAUNCH OPERATIONS
Prelaunch and launch activities (see figure 6) were conducted
by the Launch Operations Center, with the cognizance of the Integration
Center and the support of the Development and Mission Operations Centers.
The peak activity at the launch center obviously occurred after the
launch vehicles, modules and experiments were delivered, but there was
significant activity prior to this time to establish the test and
facility requirements and test procedures. Tasks performed to identify
these requirements, as related to experiments, began when the experi-
ment was approved for the program and continued throughout the develop-
ment and integration phases.
A. Launch Center Test Preparations
Prior to receiving the module hardware, postacceptance test
requirements, specifications and constraints for each experiment were
reviewed and approved in a series of formal PATRS meetings, attended
by representatives from all centers (see Section V.C). Following
these meetings, the Module Development Center compiled the applicable
module/experiment test requirements, specifications, and criteria
necessary for prelaunch checkout and launch operations into the module
Test and Checkout Requirements and Specifications Document.
Similarly, the Integration Center prepared a TCRSD for the combined
integrated systems test. Using the agreed-upon TCRSD, the launch center
prepared detailed test plans and procedures for satisfying these
requirements, subject to review by the Integration and Development Centers.
The launch center also benefited from participation in the Systems/
Operations Compatibility Assessment Review (see Section VII. A.2).
B. Receiving and Inspection
Upon arrival at the launch center, all hardware (including
GSE) underwent Receiving and Inspection (R&I). The hardware was
examined visually for any damage incurred during shipment. The ADP
was examined for completeness of all documentation and certifications
required for acceptance by the launch center. Any available transporta-
tion environmental information, such as temperature profiles, passive
accelerometer data, etc., was reviewed to assure that handling and
shipment constraints had not been violated.
Experiments that were transported to the launch center
integrated within the module passed through Receiving and Inspection
with the module. Experiments shipped separately from the module were
received independently with their own Acceptance Data Packages.
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Experiments not installed on-module, or actively involved in tests,
were placed in an environmentally controlled bonded storage area until
required for use. All GSE underwent a checkout to ensure that
it functioned properly before being mated to flight hardware.
C. Prelaunch Integration Tests
Following R&I, testing at the launch center emphasized system-
to-system interface verification. Individual experiment testing was
minimized and consisted mainly of necessary reverification of interfaces
and final calibrations.
The activities at the launch center included: 1) the assembly
and integration of modules to the launch vehicle; 2) verification of
all instrumentation, communication, environmental, electrical, mechani-
cal, and structural interfaces; 3) integrated systems tests which
exercised individual systems as well as combined systems to verify
overall space vehic e functional compatibility; 4) final Crew Compartment
Fit and Function (C F2 ) checks to assure flight crew members of proper
hardware integration, accessibility, and safety considerations; 5) final
calibration of experiment sensors; 6) stowage of perithable~tbmas;iand.
7) securing of all hardware prior to launch. - .. ri. -
D. Design Certification Review
As part of a final assessment and certification of the design
of the total mission complex, the Design Certification Reviews (DCR) for
experiments and modules were held. All involved centers participated
and the review was conducted by the NASA Headquarters Program Office.
DCR activities began prior to flight hardware shipment to the launch
center and ended during launch center operations. The purpose of the
DCR was to examine the experiment/module hardware design and the
design verification programs in order to certify that the overall
design had met the program objectives for flight worthiness and flight
safety.
The following topics were covered at the DCR: 1) an analysis
of the purpose, design, and interface compatibility of the experiments;
2) a summary of actions taken as a result of previous experiment
reviews; 3) a review of safety and reliability considerations included
in the hardware design; 4) a review of mission rules and contingency
plans; 5) an analysis of all prior hardware test programs; and 6) the
status of any remaining open action items.
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E. Flight Readiness Review
The Flight Readiness Review (FRR) was held at the launch center
prior to launch. This review assured program management that all aspects
of the space vehicle, launch vehicle, launch complex, Mission Control
Center (MCC), ground instrumentation and networks were ready for flight
operations.
The following topics were reviewed at the FRR: 1) the status
of action items resulting from the DCR; 2) any hardware configuration
changes that had occurred since the DCR; 3) the current status of pre-
launch integration testing at the launch center; 4) the status of major
anomaly reports; 5) a summary of all significant problems that arose
during testing, and their solutions; and 6) a summary of waivers or
deviations that had been granted since the DCR.
F. Launch Operations
At the conclusion of the FRR, all testing and stowage was com-
pleted and attention focused upon final closeout of the entire flight
vehicle. The launch center was responsible for the launch countdown,
with the support of the Mission Operations Center. When the flight
vehicle cleared the launch complex (i.e., umbilical tower), full respon-
sibility for flight direction reverted to the Mission Operations Center
(except that the Air Force Range Safety Officer at the launch site
retained the option of intervening if range safety became endangered).
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SECTION VII. MISSION AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS
Once the launch vehicle was in flight, the entire mission was
under the direct control of the Mission Operations Center. The pro-
cedures and techniques used to perform these functions had been under
development and rehearsal since the early phases of the program.
Figure 7 depicts the premission preparations and real-time functions
involved in conducting the mission and recovery operations.
A. Premission Preparations
Concurrently with hardware development and integration,
preparations were made for the operational phase of the mission.
This activity included the generation of mission and mission support
documents, reviews of applicable program documentation, crew training,
and the establishment and verification of operational readiness through
mission simulations.
I. Documentation Preparation. Using the ERD and module require-
ments, the Missions Operations Center prepared the basic mission docu-
ments.* The primary requirements documents were the Mission Requirements
Document (MRD) and the Reference Flight Plan (RFP). The MRD defined
the requirements and constraints for both the mission and the individual
experiments. The RFP converted the MRD information into a detailed
timeline of crew activities during the mission. These documents were
utilized during the design and integration phases to show that adequate
time and systems support would be available to perform the mission.
Shortly before launch, the updated RFP became the actual Flight Plan.
The RFP did not contain the detailed steps for performing a function,
but was limited to referencing the function (e.g., load film). The
Mission Operations Center prepared Checklists for each function (e.g.,
the detailed steps for loading the film), based upon Volume II of the
OM&H. The Checklists and Flight Plan were launched with the crew
even though they would be updated during the mission. Other operational
documents (e.g., Flight.Mission .Rules, Operational,,Data Books, etc.) were
prepared to provide further details; these are.described inAppendiWcAJ
RECOMMENDATION: Since Skylab premission estimates of crew
time required to perform work tasks in the orbital environ-
ment were not always proven accurate in real time, utilize
Skylab mission experience correlations (notably Experiment
M151, Time and Motion Study) for quantitative crew task plan-
ning for future missions.
* Although Data Request Forms (DRFs) were also prepared to identify data
processing requirements during the mission, the discussion of the DRF
is in Section VIII, Data Processing, Analysis and Reporting.
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2. Operations Compatibility Reviews. To assure an integrated
approach to mission operations, a series of Experiment Operations Plan-
ning (EOP) meetings was convened during the development and integration
phases. These meetings brought together representatives of experiment
development and integration, mission operations, flight planning, PI/
users, and various mission support groups for the purpose of assuring
that compatibility existed between experiment objectives and experiment
operations. Documentation pertaining to experiment operational require-
ments and techniques was reviewed and compared for consistency with ex-
periment objectives. Potential operational conflicts between experiments
were resolved.
A more formal program-wide review, the Systems/Operations
Compatibility Assessment Review (SOCAR) was conducted prior to DCR.
It consisted of a series of preliminary meetings, similar to EOPs, but
involving design/development and integration personnel for all Skylab
systems, interfacing with the operational personnel at both launch and
mission operations sites. It culminated in a formal presentation, by
system, to senior program management. The SOCAR was generally con-
sidered quite effective in enhancing the program's operational readi-
ness.
RECOMMENDATION: Incorporate the equivalent of the Skylab
SOCAR in the formal program milestone reviews, to be con-
ducted at the appropriate time to assure maximum coordina-
tion and subsequent readiness of the operational planning.
3. Crew Training. Maximum efficiency during on-orbit opera-
tions is attained when the flight crew is thoroughly familiar with the
hardware and the general objectives. To this end, the Skylab flight
crews underwent extensive training, first with high-fidelity mock-ups
of the experiments and modules provided by the hardware developers.
Later, during integration tests at the module development centers
(Section V) and at the launch center (Section VI), crewmen were used
in place of technicians for operating the flight hardware at every
opportunity. To simulate mission activities, the procedures for those
tests involving crew participation utilized the actual flight check-
lists wherever possible.
RECOMMENDATION: Follow up any problems or deficiencies
encountered during crew training, to assure proper reso-
lution and incorporation of any resulting hardware and/or
operational changes.
4. Mission Simulations. Prior to launch, a series of mission
simulations was performed, to exercise the flight and support personnel
in a realistic mission environment. For the purpose of these simula-
tions, the mission was divided into distinct phases, e.g., launch,
first-day activities, activation, orbital operations, etc. Each
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simulation was directed at a particular mission phase and covered a
period ranging from one 24-hour mission day, early in the simulation
program, to three consecutive 24-hour days as proficiency improved.
All activities directly involved in mission support were exer-
cised, in an atmosphere designed to reproduce the actual mission environ-
ment insofar as possible, even to the extent of introducing hypothetical
malfunctions and anomalies. Basic coordination, information flow and
operational procedures were established during these simulations. Fol-
lowing each simulation, a debriefing was conducted to discuss any opera-
tional problems uncovered, and corrective procedures were developed to
preclude their recurrence during the actual mission.
RECOMMENDATION: Conduct comprehensive prelaunch mission
simulations, utilizing all applicable communications, data
links and support personnel.
B. Mission Control
Following launch, all phases of the mission were under the con-
trol of the MCC, located at the Mission Operations Center. This in-
cluded planning for and operation of all module systems and maneuvers,
crew activities and experiment operations, from launch through recovery.
Activities were planned in near-real time on a daily basis, and all
aspects of mission operations were continuously monitored from the
ground.
The Flight Operations Director was responsible for the mission
operations and provided the management interface between the Flight
Director and Program Management. The Flight Director, operating from
the MCC, had the direct responsibility for mission control.
The general mission control functions accomplished by flight
controllers,with the technical support of other centers and support
teams, were to monitor and evaluate, in real and near-real time, the
module systems, instrument systems, scientific data, flight plan activi-
ty, condition of the flight crew, and trajectory.data. Based upon these
data, decisions were made concerning the progress of the mission toward
satisfying mission objectives and the Detailed Test Objectives from the
MRD, and the need for proceeding to alternate flight plans. The flight
crew was then advised of updated mission instructions and flight plans,
systems anomalies found during ground monitoring, ground evaluations
and recommendations to solve or circumvent any anomalies.
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C. Crew Operations/Flight Planning
The level of experiment accomplishment is related to the efficiency
of the crew operations. A prime consideration during flight plan genera-
tion is the effective utilization of crew time. In any twenty-four-hour
period, a fixed percentage of time must be devoted to crew personal
activities such as sleep, meals, exercise, personal hygiene and rest
periods. The remaining time (approximately ten hours each day was avail-
able on Skylab) is devoted to experiment operation and, as required,
systems housekeeping.
Each day during the mission, a flight plan was generated by the
MCC to cover the following day's activities. This plan, identical in
format to the premission Flight Plan, was distributed to all mission
support groups for review and comment and, after incorporation of approved
recommendations, the final version was uplinked to the crew via tele-
printer before initiation of that day's activities. Specialized informa-
tion peculiar to that day's flight plan, such as critical times for target
acquisition, precise exposure times or alterations to the on-board pro-
cedures checklists, were also uplinked as "preadvisory data" messages
(referred to as PADs). The PADs functioned as addenda to the informa-
tion stowed on-board in the Flight Data File (flight plan and checklists).
D. Mission Operational Support Teams
The functioning of the MCC during the missions was backed up by
an extensive support organization, both on-site at the Mission Operations
Center and remote at other NASA centers and contractor facilities. The
Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) was the focal point of MSFC
support activities and fulfilled a major role in the conduct of the mission.
Support teams, organized by science/technical discipline or by spacecraft
system, were composed of representatives from the development and integra-
tion centers, contractors and PIs. They monitored the mission progress
in real time, and provided the MCC with immediately available expertise
relative to any experiment or system anomaly that arose. Each team ini-
tiated and/or reviewed proposed mission changes to ensure satisfaction of
the requirements and constraints of their particular area of concern.
Their basic task was to assure the optimum success of their experiments
in the face of whatever off-nominal conditions might occur during the
mission. The primary areas of team concern were: 1) continual planning of
future activity necessary to achieve maximum experiment success with relation
to all other mission parameters, and 2) rapid and accurate response to any
in-flight anomaly, either vehicle or experiment-related, to maximize the
experiment data returned under the prevailing conditions. In connection
with the flight planning activity, the Skylab experiment support teams
made regular inputs to the "Science Planning Meetings," conducted twice
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weekly by the Program Scientist at the Mission Operations Center, which
proved to be an effective means for influencing the MCC flight planning.
RECOMMENDATIONS: The primary recommendations resulting
from Skylab experiment mission support experience were:
o Utilize personnel for mission support who have
participated in experiment development and/or
integration and have experience with hardware-
related problems. Ready availability of the PIs
or their authorized representatives is highly
desirable, particularly for the more complex
experiments.
o Provide near-continuous communication between space-
craft and MCC, more direct communication and data
links between MCC and the mission support teams,
and fewer intermediaries between the teams and the
flight crew during anomaly troubleshooting. Also,
limited but frequent direct communications between
the flight crew and the PIs are both feasible and
productive.
o Provide mission support teams with available experi-
ment hardware to permit realistic ground simulation,
facilitating real-time troubleshooting.
o Utilize trainer walk-throughs by ground-based
astronauts to check out late additions and real-
time procedural changes before transmitting them
to the crew.
o Emphasize active participation of experiment
mission support teams in influencing preparation
of daily flight plans by maintaining liaison with
the MCC flight planners and supporting semiweekly
science planning meetings.
E. Recovery Operations
Operations at the recovery site were planned to ensure that
the integrity of physically returned experiment data (primarily
photographic film and specimens) was not compromised and that pre-
scribed handling and delivery requirements were satisfied. These
requirements, along with any applicable support functions, had been
identified early in the program. Preliminary recovery site require-
ments for each experiment were identified in the original ERDs, and
specific handling procedures were later defined by means of DRFs.
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These forms were used to detail temperature and humidity limits to be
observed, shielding requirements if applicable, special containers
required to protect the data, or other handling techniques necessary
to isolate the material from the external environment.
Following retrieval of the crew and spacecraft, recovery site
operations included deactivating potentially hazardous systems and
securing the module subsystems; initiation of ground support functions
such as purges, thermal conditioning, ground power, etc.; and the
retrieval of experiment and subsystems flight data. The returned data
were removed and packaged for transportation to the data distribution
center and subsequent processing and/or dissemination to the PIs and
data users.
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SECTION VIII. DATA PROCESSING, ANALYSIS AND REPORTING
Data requirements of the experiment Principal Investigator or
data user were initially stated in ERDs and subsequently amplified in
DRFs. Using these requirements, the Mission Operations Center developed
the plans and software required to retrieve, process and distribute all
flight data. The development centers were responsible for the Mission
Evaluation Reports, and the Principal Investigator or data user was
responsible for scientific data analyses and reporting of results.
Figure 8 shows the functional flow for this phase.
RECOMMENDATION: Clearly define the respective
responsibilities of NASA and the participating
scientists in the following areas:
o Funding
o Data retrieval, processing and delivery
o Systems performance data required
o Proprietary rights to data
o Reporting requirements
o Data security, accountability and archiving
o Involvement in Public Affairs Office activities.
This was accomplished late in the Skylab Program by
implementation of the Experiment Scientific Data
Analysis and Reporting Documents (ESDARDs).
A. Premission Preparations
During the premission phase, arrangements were made for the
acquisition of data pertinent to experiment success. The initial
requirements were stated in the ERDs. The DRF was later employed as
the formal method of requesting data for all users. The data required
for the scientific investigations was defined by the PI/user, docu-
mented on DRFs, and submitted to a data requirements group at the
Mission Operations Center for approval, processing and implementation.
The DRFs specified the data recipient, the pertinent data required, the
specific times during the mission when the data was to be acquired,
desired format, and the date when the data was needed.
Based upon the DRFs, the Mission Operations Center prepared
software programs for general processing of the flight data. Further
(more detailed) processing, required by certain experiments, was
provided by the cognizant EDC. Available programs were exercised
during the mission simulations, using recorded data generated during
the integration tests.
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FIGURE 8. DATA PROCESSING, ANALYSIS AND REPORTING
RECOMMENDATION: Skylab data processing and analysis
proved to be far more complex and time-consuming
(and therefore more costly) than anticipated, indi-
cating the need for more emphasis on premission
rehearsals of the entire sequence, in order to op-
timize the operations, shorten data retrieval time,
and determine realistic time and cost requirements
for these activities.
B. Flight Data Processing
Flight data was received and catalogued at the Mission Opera-
tions Center both during and after the mission. Returned flight
samples were released to the PI for examination and analysis. Opera-
tional film and much of the scientific film were processed by the
Mission Operations Center and duplicates distributed to the data
users. In special cases, scientific films were delivered to the PIs
for processing and analysis, with the understanding that the original
flight film and a reproducible master were to be returned to archives
at the completion of the analysis. Recorded and telemetry data were
processed through appropriate software programs and reduced to com-
puter-compatible tapes prior to release to the data users. Other
requested data formats included: tabular forms, strip charts, micro-
film, transcripts, video tapes and digital television displays.
C. Data Accountability
The PI was normally granted proprietary use of the returned
scientific data for a one-year period after all requested data was
delivered to him. He was responsible for the physical security and
integrity of all mission data received by him while it was in his
possession. He was required to take proper action to prevent loss,
theft or unauthorized use of this material (refer to MSFC Management
Instruction 4010.2). At the conclusion of this period, all orbital
material was required to be returned to the EDC archives. Thereafter,
NASA retained control of the returned material for possible further
scientific investigations.
D. Scientific Data Reporting
A PI was normally granted initial publication rights to
experiment data for a period of one year. Each PI was responsible
for generating periodic reports of his investigative findings at
intervals of 30 days, 90 days, 6 months and 1 year after splashdown.
Normally, within the 1-year period, the PI was to deliver a final
report of his experiment results for publication. [NOTE: The PIfs
proprietary and publication rights, indicated above, will in no way
preclude government access to and use of data for mission analysis,
troubleshooting, or other official purposes]
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E. Mission Evaluation Reports
The cognizant NASA centers were required to prepare Systems
Mission Evaluation Reports within six months following mission comple-
tion. These reports (see References 6 and 7) contained performance
evaluations of experiment and systems hardware for which the reporting
NASA center had development responsibility, and also assessed the
degree to which operational constraints and interface requirements had
been met during the mission. They did not attempt to evaluate the
scientific significance of experiment data.
F. Final Technical Reports
Concurrently with preparation of the Mission Evaluation Reports,
the EIC prepared a final technical report (Reference 8), tracing the
evolution of Skylab corollary experiment development and integration
from the initial experiment concepts through mission operations. Simi-
lar final technical reports were produced for the Apollo Telescope
Mount experiments (Reference 9) and for each Skylab module.
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SECTION IX. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
The configuration management system provided a control cycle
for systematic evaluation, coordination and approval or disapproval of
all proposed changes to baselined specifications, hardware or systems,
to ensure that all.involved organizations were working to common con-
figuration baselines. Early identification, timely baselining, and
accurate, up-to-date maintenance of the hardware configuration status
and related design and operational documentation are essential to
effective program management, if for no other reason than to minimize
changes. The application of refined configuration management methods
and controls contributed to the successful integration of Skylab.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Configuration management can be
made more straightforward (and thus less costly) if the
following documentation ground rules are adhered to:
o Establish a clear-cut, nonredundant documentation
tree early in the program, and enforce it on all
program elements.
o Definitive information should appear in only one
document, and each document should be tailored
to suit its purpose, omitting nonpertinent or
redundant information.
o Impose program-wide standard formats for major
document types, such as EIS and ERD.
o Baseline documents prior to initiation of activi-
ties that require their guidance.
o Formally delete documents (or sections thereof)
from the program as soon as their purpose has
been served.
A. Configuration Control Organization
The primary organizations responsible for the Skylab configura-
tion control system were:
1. Configuration Control Boards. The CCB was a primary function
of the systems engineering activity and included representatives from
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the various project offices and technical systems disciplines as appro-
priate. Control of the many interrelated documents (see Appendix A) was
accomplished on a multilevel basis:
The Level I CCB approved changes to the baselined overall pro-
gram requirements, including program objectives, experiment assignments,
major schedule milestones, and budget allocations. Approval authority
rested with the NASA Headquarters Program Director. The Level I CCB
also acted to resolve any matters referred to it by the Level II CCB.
The Level II CCB approved changes to baselined requirement or
configuration documentation which would impact two or more centers (or
two or more project offices within a single center). Approval authority
rested with the center-level Program Managers. All affected projects
and centers evaluated proposed changes for impacts to their respective
areas of responsibility, prior to Level II CCB action. This ensured
that the total impact of a proposed change was fully understood, tech-
nically assessed, and compatible with established requirements, costs
and schedules. If a change affected primary mission objectives, experi-
ment assignments, authorized funding, or major program milestones, the
Level II CCB could either disapprove the change or refer it to the Level
I CCB for disposition.
The Level III CCB approved changes to baseline requirement or
configuration documentation affecting a single project office within
the jurisdiction of a single center. Approval authority rested with
each Project Manager responsible for development of a major module or
group of experiments.
The Level IV boards, often informally at a hardware contractor's
facility, controlled discretionary internal changes not affecting para-
meters controlled at higher levels.
2. Change Integration Working Group (CIWG). The CIWG included
representatives of the various technical systems disciplines and systems
engineering and integration, and performed a screening function for the
CCBs throughout the premission phase of the program. This group proved
to be a primary tool for ensuring that the early design was well coor-
dinated.
3. Configuration Change Integration. A configuration management
support group was established at each involved center to maintain an up-
to-date status of interfacing hardware and documentation and to process
requested changes. This group coordinated all proposed changes to en-
sure that the interests of all interfacing organizations had been con-
sidered. This function was referred to as configuration change inte-
gration. It included receipt of proposed changes, coordination with
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all affected organizations to determine total impact of the change
(including cost and schedule), submittal to the appropriate CCB for
action, and maintenance of overall configuration status.
B. Configuration Control Operation
Changes to documentation and to hardware prior to baselining
were controlled initially by the originator or the hardware developer.
Once baselined, full configuration change control was implemented.
The proper intercenter experiment change process is illustrated in
figure 9.
Necessary changes were identified in various ways: by con-
tinuing compatibility assessment of the related documents, by the
respective hardware milestone reviews, duringihardware develoipmemt,
testing and manufacture, or by the addition or deletion of experiments
during the program. The changes were generally initiated either by
the hardware developer or by the Integration Center support groups.
If initiated by the hardware developer, an Engineering Change Proposal
(ECP) was prepared to define the change and its impact to the hardware,
systems, specifications, interface documents, cost and schedule. The
preliminary ECP was submitted to CIWG by the originator, and was re-
viewed for impact on program documentation by the compatibility analysis
support group, and technically coordinated with the affected PIs (!
and others as necessary. If incompatibilities were identified, an
Engineering Change Request (ECR) and supporting change documentation
were prepared. The ECR was an adaptation of the ECP for use primarily
with program documents and specifications. The ECP, ECR and supporting
documents formed a total package which presented all the change impacts
for CCB evaluation. The approval, approval with changes, or disapproval
by the CCB chairman was implemented by a Configuration Control Board
Directive (CCBD).
Changes were also initiated by the Integration Center (through
the support groups) when incompatibilities were identified. In this
event, the ECR was prepared and submitted to the CIWG for subsequent
CCB action. The hardware developer received and analyzed the ECR for
impact and, if an impact was identified, prepared an ECP to define it.
The ECP and the ECR were then processed by the CCB, as above.
The CCBD resulted in the preparation of Change Orders or Supple-
mental Agreements for transmittal to the affected contractor(s) or Pro-
ject Offices, directing the incorporation of the change into the docu-
ments and hardware. Document changes were incorporated and distributed
by the document custodians.
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FIGURE 9. INTERCENTER EXPERIMENT CHANGE FLOW
C. Complete Change Package
It is essential that any change proposal identify all the
hardware and documentation (at the same or other levels) which may be
affected thereby. Accordingly, when a change was initiated from any
source, the Integration Center formally conducted a change impact
assessment. This assessment identified impacts to all interfacing
hardware and documentation that might be affected. A checklist was
used to identify the areas to be investigated. The changes were
precoordinated with all affected organizations by the Integration
Center before the CCB meeting. Thus the Integration Center was able
to prepare a complete and coordinated change package for assessment
at the CCB meeting. The Integration Center was uniquely qualified
to perform this function and, by so doing, assured completeness and
consistency of format and relieved other affected organizations of
the need to expend resources to perform this task. Use of this
technique greatly expedited CCB control of experiment-related changes
at MSFC during the later stages of the Skylab Program.
RECOMMENDATION: Utilize the "Complete Change Package"
concept and precoordinate change packages with all
appropriate disciplines prior to presentation to the
CCB. NOTE: Configuration control cannot wait for
each organization to finalize its document changes
before acting on a proposal. The CCB Directive
documenting a decision will specify any modifications
to the change proposal that are considered necessary
by the CCB. Document update pages implementing the
CCB direction can then be prepared and distributed
by the responsible organizations.
D. Configuration Control Milestones
Configuration control closely followed the hardware development
milestones. Following the PRR for each experiment and module, the re-
quirements documents were baselined and thus came under CCB control
for changes. After PDR the documents that defined the approved design
approach were controlled by the CCB. Likewise, follownggCDR, the
approved detail design and test specifications came under CCB control.
When two or more development activities took place in parallel
(such as experiment and module development) there were three key Level
II CCB functions that permitted these activities to proceed smoothly.
The first occurred following the development PRRs, when the ERDs were
placed under Level II control, even though they had been baselined
previously at Level III. This allowed assurances to both developers
that their design approaches were based on firm requirements, i.e.,
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that changes to interface requirements would be minimized and necessary
changes identified to all concerned. The second function occurred
during the design period prior to PDR, when the ICDs prepared by the
module center had to be coordinated with the EDC to ensure mutual
agreement on the interface details. These preliminary ICDs were then
baselined at PDR, at which time they came under Level II control.
With Level II ICDs, the developers could continue their detail designs
with assurance of having firm interface agreements. The third major
CCB function at Level II was control of the TCRSDs, which allowed the
Module Development and Launch Operations Centers to prepare their
detailed test procedures for testing the integrated systems.
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SECTION X. SPECIAL DISCIPLINES
Requirements established by specification for safety, reli-
ability, maintainability and quality assurance affected all phases
of the program and were necessary to assure mission success. Inter-
related with these requirements, specific attention was focused on
crew systems (i.e., man/systems integration, or "human engineering"),
materials compatibility, contamination control, and various other
systems-oriented disciplines. The impacts of these special disci-
plines upon an individual experiment were influenced to some extent
by the criticality of that experiment's potential failures.
Experiments were categorized in the EIS according to the
criticality (severity) of potential effects that could be produced
by their worst-case failure modes. Criticality category identifica-
tions varied between centers, but were generally consistent with the
following basic definitions:
Category 1 (or I) - Adversely affects personnel.safety
(flight or ground).
Category 2 (or II) - Causes loss of a primary mission
objective but does not adversely affect personnel
safety (includes unscheduled termination of launch or
mission).
Category 3 (or IIIA) - May cause loss of a secondary
mission objective but does not adversely affect per-
sonnel safety or preclude the achievement of a primary
mission objective.
Category 4 (or IIIB) - None of the above; generally
applicable to relatively passive experiments with
very simple interfaces.
RECOMMENDATION: Standardize criticality category
and sub-category designations to be used by all
program elements.
The criticality category influenced the scope of the safety,
reliability, quality assurance and test programs at the experiment,,
module and overall program levels. Increased safety margins,
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special design features, increased inspections during fabrication
and assembly, and special tests to ensure existence of adquate mar-
gins are examples of considerations given to experiments that had
high-risk failure modes. The worst-case classification was applied
without regard to probability of occurrence.
A. Safety
To ensure that hazards were identified and resolved throughout
the program, the development centers required formal or informal im-
plementation of safety program requirements for each end item. This
program assured that methods were adequately implemented for identifi-
cation and either elimination or control of potential hardware hazards
that could result in injury to personnel or damage or loss of flight
or ground hardware. Hazard Analyses were performed to identify, and
offer solutions for, hazards that could result from failures, normal
or emergency equipment operations, environments, personnel errors,
or design characteristics. A "System Safety Checklist" (Reference 10),
containing specific design criteria applicable to flight and ground
hardware, has been developed to assist new programs in the appli-
cation of safety-related experience.
B. Reliability
Integral to the design and development process was the evalua-
tion of hardware reliability through analysis, review and assessment.
A Reliability Plan was prepared for each end item, describing how the
reliability requirements were to be implemented and controlled.
Hardware failure modes were defined in FMEAs. Based on the results
of the FMEAs, a Critical Items List (CIL) was prepared, which included
a summary of single failure points and critical redundant (backup) com-
ponents in life- or mission-essential equipment. In addition, design
criteria were provided for the reliability of each subsystem. Reliability
testing per se was generally not done; however, in certain very critical
cases, some lifetime testing was conducted. After the hardware was
fabricated, a system of providing information on unsatisfactory condi-
tions or anomalies was utilized to keep abreast of reliability goals.
C. Maintainability
The requirements for maintainability are closely associated
with reliability and safety requirements during all program phases,
with the major effort concentrated in the design phase. The princi-
pal elements of maintainability assurance are: 1) provide design
parameters (e.g., mean-time-to-repair, fault detection and isolation,
limited lifetime items); 2) analysis of design; 3) design review
participation; 4) data on maintainability; and 5) verification anddemonstration of the maintainability.
46
To the extent practicable, experiments were designed for
accessibility, replaceability and serviceability during ground opera-
tions. Skylab's original design philosophy specifically minimized
in-flight maintenance as a design consideration. The rationale for
this decision was quite logical in the circumstances. Inadequate
data existed at that time on the astronauts' ability to perform com-
plex tasks in space, or on the crew time, workshop space and weight
budget that would be available. Thus extensive reliance upon in-
flight maintenance, rather than designing for high inherent relia-
bility, would have involved high risk. Actually, as the program
matured, some minimal in-flight maintenance provisions were found to
be essential, and were added. During the actual missions, however,
in coping with unforeseen anomalies, the astronauts demonstrated
excellent capabilities in this respect, even with improvised tools
and in extravehicular activity (EVA).
RECOMMENDATION: Design future manned space hardware
to permit a much greater degree of in-flight mainte-
nance, including EVA. Provide appropriate on-board
spares, crew training and supporting documentation
for maintenance tasks.
D. Quality Assurance
A Quality Assurance Program was implemented to ensure that
all necessary actions were taken to provide confidence that the
experiment would perform satisfactorily during flight. The quality
program provided methods for detecting, documenting and analyzing
deficiencies, system incompatibilities, or trends that could have
led to any unsatisfactory quality of the experiment hardware.
At all sites (development, integration, launch, mission
operations), a general method was used for reporting all anomalies
(failures and unsatisfactory conditions) relating to flight, test,
simulator or training hardware. The reports identified the anomaly,
where it had occurred, and the corrective action required. All
participants (quality, engineering, test, NASA, etc.) concurred in
the corrective action by signature. Within this formal method of
tracking anomalies and recording their solutions, quality assurance
personnel were responsible for verifying that the anomaly occurred
as stated and that corrective action requirements were adhered to.
A Failure Analysis was performed, where necessary, to determine the
cause of the anomaly and identify adequate measures that could be
implemented to prevent its recurrence. A status was maintained on
all open anomalies until they were satisfactorily resolved.
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E. Crew Systems
Strong emphasis in the design, development and integration of
Skylab experiments and modules was placed upon man/systems integration
and human engineering, to ensure efficient utilization of the ground
and flight crews' capabilities in the applicable environments. Man/
system design criteria were established for ready accessibility and
identification, convenient arrangement, and ease of operation of ex-
periments and cluster systems equipment. General cluster habitability,
fixed and portable illumination, controls and displays, mobility aids
and restraints, stowage, and provisions for extravehicular activities
received particular attention.
High-fidelity mock-ups and/or training hardware were utilized
to conduct numerous formal reviews and informal walk-throughs by
astronauts, PIs, and integration personnel during the development
and integration phases. The C2F2 tests were conducted on flight hard-
ware as a part of acceptance tests and prelaunch checkout. Walk-
throughs were also extensively used during the missions to check out
new or revised operational procedures before transmitting them to the
flight crew. Extraordinary activities involving EVA (e.g., deployment
of a damaged solar panel) were rehearsed in the MSFC Neutral Buoyancy
Simulator.
Postflight evaluation of Skylab crew systems hardware is docu-
mented in Reference 11. Additionally, Reference 12 was prepared to
provide new and more clearly defined design criteria, based on Skylab
experience, for use on future programs. Experiment-related lessons
learned are included in the recommendations of Sections IV, V and VII,
and in Appendix D.
F. Materials Program
Skylab policy for controlling materials selection, test and
evaluation required that each Development Center Program Office prepare
an implementation plan and identify an individual materials specialist
to serve as focal point for the center's materials program. Intercenter
coordination was accomplished by a materials intercenter working group,
which exchanged pertinent information, test data and deviations, and
reconciled differ.ences between the centers. Hardware developers were
required to submit appropriate materials and parts lists, under their
respective Reliability Plans.
The Skylab materials program placed particular emphasis on
reduction of fire hazards in the oxygen-enriched spacecraft atmosphere,
through the use of nonflammable materials wherever feasible, and
rigidly controlled usage of any necessary flammable materials. Other
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important materials characteristics assessed were toxicity, odor,
outgassing, offgassing, and flaking or powdering tendencies of paints
and coatings. Materials information and test data provided signifi-
cant inputs to the in-flight contamination control program.
These activities on Skylab resulted in the preparation and
release of a new OMSF material evaluation criteria document,
NHB 8060.1. Although released too late for formal implementation on
Skylab, NHB 8060.1 is understood to be a requirement for current OMSF
programs.
G. Contamination Control
Hardware cleanliness monitoring prior to launch is a quality
assurance function, amply covered by specifications and conventional
quality control methods imposed on Skylab. However, analysis and
control of the contamination that can occur in and around an orbiting
spacecraft emerged as an important new discipline that warranted
status approaching that of a major functional system. In-flight con-
tamination, internal or external to the spacecraft, presented potential
problems for nearly all experiments and cluster systems, notably those
involving critical optics or other operational surfaces.
A Contamination Control Working Group, including
representation from MSFC, JSC, KSC, the PIs and contractors, was
established at the Integration Center to conduct, coordinate and
manage these efforts. Potential contamination sources were identified
and quantitatively defined with the help of extensive materials testing.
Experiment and system sensitivities to contamination were determined.
Rigorous analyses, supplemented by comprehensive systems ground test-
ing, were conducted to develop mathematical models of the performance
of the sources and thereby predict in-flight contamination levels.
Recommendations were made for design and operational procedure
criteria and changes to minimize contamination effects (e.g., proper
timelining of experiment exposure or operation in relation to various
sources such as reaction control system firings and overboard venting).
Instrumentation was flown, such as quartz-crystal microbalances to
monitor mass deposition rates and cloud brightness monitors for the
induced atmosphere around the spacecraft. Flight data from these
monitors and from certain experiments was used to validate and improve
the prediction models' accuracy. The major sources of in-flight con-
tamination, as predicted, were materials outgassing and reaction
control system firings. The total Skylab experience clearly demon-
strated the necessity for, and the validity of, these measures.
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A detailed description and evaluation of the Skylab contamina-
tion control program is available in Reference 13. Some experiment-
related design considerations are identified in Appendix D.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Implement rigorous and comprehensive
measures for in-flight contamination control early in
any new program, particularly where optical experiments
are involved. Integrate the degradation effects of all
contributory systems into the program design criteria
on a level comparable to the major functional systems.
Investigate new techniques for in-flight cleaning of
accessible and remote optics.
H. Other Special Disciplines
Various other Skylab systems engineering activities influenced
experiment development and integration.
1. Electromagnetic Compatibility. An intercenter/contractor
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Working Group monitored compliance
with the Skylab requirement that hardware be free of adverse electro-
magnetic interference (EMI) under operational conditions. EMC
compliance was established during the design phase and demonstrated
predominantly by component-level testing, where circuit analysis was
not considered adequate. A minimum of EMC testing was conducted at
the module level to confirm the lower-level results. The EMC Working
Group reviewed all pertinent designs, analyses, tests and waivers.
No major EMI problems were encountered during the Skylab missions.
2. Corona Suppression. A management-supported, program-wide
effort to emphasize corona prevention was the key to success in this
area. Corona specialists conducted frequent reviews of designs and testplans with their originators. This effort proved sufficient to minimize
the degree of testing required and the rework of test failures that
occurred, while maximizing the assurances gained. No serious loss
of data or system failure due to corona effects occurred during the
Skylab missions.
3. Sneak Circuit Analysis. A sneak circuit analysis was
performed on the integrated electrical systems to assure a low proba-bility of undesired current paths. A computer was used to help
develop a simplified schematic of Skylab circuits for evaluation.
This analysls verified electrical interfaces and provided valuable
source matc!rial for checking operational documentation and forinvestigating real-time operational anomalies and workarounds.
The program was successful in identifying 44 sneak circuits, plus
a number of unnecessary components and documentation errors.
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SECTION XI. PUBLIC RELATIONS
Public awareness of program objectives, progress and benefits
is an important obligation for NASA, which must be shared by the
scientific investigator. Different approaches for public relations
were required for the various experiments, depending upon an experi-
ment's public appeal, the public's awareness of the Principal Investi-
gator, and their ability to comprehend the science and potential
applications of the experiment.
A. NASA Public Affairs Office
Each NASA center maintains a Public Affairs Office (PAO), with
established contacts for releasing space-oriented news to the media.
Standard public affairs releases, consisting of NASA photographs with
captions and prepared news stories, were released to the national news
services. These releases normally contained only general background
experiment information.
Press conferences which required the PI's participation were
arranged periodically. They were generally scheduled for periods of
peak public interest in the experiments (e.g., immediately prior to
launch, following experiment performance or return of flight data,
or to present results of flight data analysis). These briefings
were held where the space-oriented press was gathered; at the launch
center for launch, and at the operations center during mission opera-
tions. Often a press conference presentation led to a private inter-
view with a newspaper, periodical, or news service reporter.
The press is primarily interested in results which can easily
be understood by the public, i.e., the "biggest", the "best", or the
"first." It was extremely helpful when the PI played an active role
in releasing photographs of returned data with lucid explanations of
the observable scientific phenomena. Scientific analysis was not
required, or even desirable, in these press releases; simply a state-
ment of what occurred and its potential significance. The objective
of press briefings and press releases is to achieve public awareness,
rather than public education. An active interplay or established
liaison with the PAO assured the PI that accurate experiment informa-
tion was being released, while the PAO was guaranteed interesting,
newsworthy releases.
RECOMMENDATION: Statements for public release should
not be issued without prior program approval.
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B. Educational Programs
Various educational programs initiated by NASA may require
participation by the PI and/or experiment development or integration
personnel. The following educational aids can be produced by NASA
with limited participation required from these personnel.
o Film Clips - Ten-minute motion pictures can be filmed
of the PI explaining and demonstrating his experiment
and the application of its results. These films are
useful in providing program personnel with a more
thorough understanding of the experiments, or as pres-
entations demonstrating the state-of-the-art of space
research to science students.
o Educational Aids - Science educational aids can be
prepared to describe groups of experiments, the appli-
cation of basic principles of science and physics to
execute the experiments, and the scientific value of
the results.
o Displays - Visitor center or museum-type displays can
be distributed to visually stimulate the public's
interest in space technology.
o Postmission Historical Texts - Books printed after
mission completion, with extensive use of mission and
experiment photographs, can provide an informative,
nontechnical presentation of mission/experiment oper-
ations and results.
Many different types of documents and presentations may be
produced for educational purposes. These are the principal ones
which will require a degree of cooperation and information from
experiment personnel.
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DOCUMENTATION
The principal experiment-related development, integration and
mission operations documents required and utilized on the Skylab pro-
gram are described in this Appendix. A documentation tree illustrating
their primary interrelationships is shown in figure A-I. All documents
were subordinate to the OMSF Skylab Program Specification, SE 140-001-1,
which was the top-level technical specification for major program func-
tional and performance requirements.
A. Experiment Development Documentation
The approved Experiment Implementation Plan (EIP), as described
in Section III.C.1, provided the initial experiment definition, from
which formal development documentation was derived.
An OMSF "Experiment General Specification for Hardware Develop-
ment" (EGS) identified requirements to be selectively imposed upon ex-
periment developers, at the discretion of the Experiment Development
Center. Considerable flexibility was permitted in EGS implementation(depending upon the experiment's complexity and criticality) to mini-
mize development costs within the constraints of crew safety and mis-
sion success. As an EDC, JSC imposed its own "Experiment Hardware
General Requirements Document" (EHGRD), which generally paralleled EGS
requirements but differed in some significant details. Specific devel-
opment documentation requirements identified in these two specifications
were similar, except as otherwise noted herein.
RECOMMENDATION: Establish and maintain uniformity
of requirements among diverse experiment developers
by selective implementation of a single coordinated
general requirements specification across all pro-
gram elements.
Development documents were categorized by the cognizant EDC
as: Type I, to be submitted for approval; Type II, to be submittedfor review; or Type III, required to be available upon request, but
not formally submitted. The Type I category was generally limitedto documents that defined and/or controlled major elements of program
cost, schedule, or performance.
1. Management Plan. At the outset of the development effort,a Management Plan was prepared by the ED for EDC approval, defining
the management organization and procedures to be used during develop-
ment of the experiment hardware and GSE. It defined the responsibilities
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FIGURE A-1 EXPERIMENT-RELATED DOCUMENTATION
and controls to be established and maintained throughout an integrated
development effort, covering all hardware and GSE for which the developer
was responsible. The plan contained the following sections:
o General Management 
- defining the management structure,
responsibilities and controls for the overall
development effort
o Quality Assurance - defining a Quality Program Plan
and a Contamination Control Plan
o Reliability Plan
o Configuration Management Plan
o Test Management Plan
o Logistics Support Plan
o Manufacturing Plan
o Development Schedule 
- defining detailed schedules for
the design, manufacturing and test efforts, includ-
ing all related configuration management reviews,
documentation and hardware deliveries
o Nonmetallic Materials Plan (EHGRD only)
o System Safety Plan (EHGRD only)
2. Configuration Management Documents
a. End Item Specification. The ED was required to pre-
pare and maintain a detailed End Item Specification (EIS) for each
type of experiment hardware identified in his Statement of Work (i.e.,
flight, mock-up and training hardware, and GSE). The EIS contained
the total requirements for the development program and formed the
technical basis for the contract between the ED and EDC. Specifica-
tions were prepared on a paragraph-by-paragraph deviation basis to
the EGS or EHGRD. The flight hardware EIS was prepared and approved
beforestarting any development effort; minimum inputs for its prepara-
tion were the experiment proposal, EIP, and compatibility assessment.
The flight hardware EIS covered also the backup, qualification test,
and flight-type training hardware, which were required to be identical
in configuration with the flight article. The EISs for other hardware
were generally prepared on a deviation basis from the flight hardware
EIS.
The EIS outline, as prescribed by the EGS, is shown in Table
A-I. [NOTE: The JSC EIS, as per the EHGRD, was essentially identical
through the area of Performance and Design Requirements, but thereafter
included more detail in the areas of Quality Assurance, Reliability,Verification, Configuration Management and Documentation. JSC utilized
a separate Configuration Specification as the control document for hard-
ware development, in lieu of the Part II EIS]
After initial approval, specification changes could be incor-
porated only through CCB-approved Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs)
and Specification Change Notices (SCNs).
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TABLE A-I. END ITEM SPECIFICATION OUTLINE (PER EGS)
PART I. PERFORMANCE/DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
1. SCOPE (including Criticality Category)
1.1 Changes
2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
3. PERFORMANCE AND DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
3.1 Performance
3.1.1 Functional (Overall System; Mechanical, Electrical/
Electronic and Other Subsystems)
3.1.2 Operability (Reliability, Maintainability, Useful Life,
Natural and Induced Environments, Transportability,
Human Engineering, Safety)
3.2 Interface Requirements
3.2.1 Flight Hardware (Flight Vehicle, Other Experiments,
Ground Communications, Flight Crew, Mission, GSE,
Facilities)
3.2.2 Zero Gravity Type Training Hardware
3.2.3 Neutral Buoyancy Type Training Hardware
3.2.4 Simulator Type Training Hardware
3.2.5 ICD List
3.3 Design and Construction
3.3.1 Mechanical
3.3.2 Electrical and Electronic
3.3.3 Fluid (Gas and Liquid)
3.3.4 Debris Protection
3.3.5 Cleanliness
3.3.6 Test Provisions
3.3.7 Single Failure Points
3.3.8 Redundancy
3.3.9 Selection of Specifications and Standards
3.3.10 Materials, Parts and Processes
3.3.11 Standard Parts
3.3.12 Fungus Resistance
3.3.13 Corrosion Prevention
3.3.14 Interchangeability and Replaceability
3.3.15 Workmanship
3.3.16 Electromagnetic Interference
3.3.17 Identification and Marking
3.3.18 Storage
3.3.19 Pyrotechnic Devices
4. TEST/PRODUCT ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
4.1 Verification Matrix
4.2 Test Types
4.2.1 Development
4.2.2 Qualification
4.2.3 Reliability
4.2.4 Other Tests (Integrated Systems, Flight Verification,
Postflight)
4.3 Rejection
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TABLE A-I. END ITEM SPECIFICATION OUTLINE (PER EGS) (Continued)
5. DATA LIST
6. PREPARATION FOR DELIVERY
7. NOTES
PART II. PRODUCT CONFIGURATION REQUIREMENTS
1. SCOPE
1.1 Product Configuration Baseline Acceptance
1.2 Changes
2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
3. PRODUCT REQUIREMENTS
3.1 Performance
3.1.1 Functional Characteristics
3.2 Configuration
3.2.1 Manufacturing Drawings
4. TEST/PRODUCT ACCEPTANCE REQUIREMENTS
4.1 Acceptance Matrix
4.2 Test Types
4.2.1 Acceptance
4.2.2 Other Tests (Integrated Systems, Prelaunch)
4.3 Rejection
5. DATA LIST
6. PREPARATION FOR DELIVERY
6.1 Preservation and Packaging
6.2 Packing
6.3 Shipment
7. NOTES
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b. Engineering Drawings. The ED prepared engineering
drawings to control, by means of pictorial or narrative presentations,
the physical and functional engineering requirements for each part of
the hardware to be produced. The drawing tree progressed from the top
assembly drawing to detail component and part drawings. They provided,
directly or by reference, all data needed for use in conjunction with
specifications, test procedures and reports, inspection procedures,
acceptance and rejection criteria, processes, manuals, operational pro-
cedures, safety precautions, surface cleanliness requirements, etc.
The engineering drawings included:
o All essential drawing information needed to permit an
evaluation or a feasibility study of the proposed design,
or to document the results of exploratory research or
development effort.
o Sufficient detail to enable evaluation and control of
physical and functional design interrelationships of
interdependent components, equipments, subsystems,
systems, ground support equipment or facilities.
o All drawing information necessary to support installa-
tion, operation, maintenance and interchangeability
during tests and operational use.
o The necessary design, engineering, manufacturing and
quality support information, directly or by reference,
to enable the procurement, without additional design
effort or recourse to the original design activity, of
an item that duplicated the physical and performance
characteristics of the original design.
c. Technical Reports. The results of studies and analy-
ses performed during the development effort were documented in tech-
nical reports. The reports covered load analyses, stress analyses,
trade-off studies, etc., and were not standardized in format.
d. Review Minutes. Minutes were prepared for each PRR,
PDR and CDR. The minutes for each review consisted of two parts.
Part A provided an immediate record of the review proceedings and
included all items requiring post-review actions. Part B was pre-
pared after the final disposition of all Part A action items, and
reported the final disposition of each. (See Appendix C.)
e. Configuration Inspection (Acceptance) Review Report.
A CIR Report was prepared for each acceptance review (see Appendix C).
It provided a record of the review results, including:
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o Action items with their disposition
o Waivers or deviations authorized
o Shortages authorized
o Copy of the completed Form DD250 (Material, Inspection
and Receiving Report)
3. Quality Assurance Documents..
a. Acceptance Data Package. The ED prepared an Acceptance
Data Package (ADP) for each deliverable hardware end item. After deliv-
ery, the ADP stayed with the hardware and was updated to reflect subse-
quent usage. The hardware custodian was responsible for maintaining
the ADP current as required. The package included but was not neces-
sarily limited to the following:
o Equipment logs (see item A.3.c)
o Engineering drawings down to the replaceable component
level (see item A.2.b)
o Inventory of serialized components, including part number,
name, serial number, and the associated experiment
hardware subsystem
o Report of actual weight and center of gravity
o Operating, Maintenance and Handling (OM&H) procedures
(see item A.7)
o Calibration Data Report (see item A.5.e)
o Listing of all Material Review Records (see item A.3.b)
o End Item Specification, Parts I and II or ConfigurationSpecification (see item A.2.a)
o Certification that the hardware had been cleaned in
accordance with the Contamination Control Plan (see
item A.1)
o Failure Reports and Failure Analysis and Corrective
Action Reports (see items A.3.d & e)
o Configuration Inspection (Acceptance) Review Report
(see item A.2.e)
b. Material Review Records. A Material Review Board(MRB) at the hwadware development site was composed of ED design
engineering and quality representatives and the EDC's designated
quality representative. The MRB reviewed and determined disposition
of articles or materials submitted by ED quality assurance as "non-
conforming" with applicable drawings, specifications or other require-
ments. Accurate Material Review Records of MRB actions, including
assurance of effective remedial and preventive actions, were main-
tained and incorporated in the appropriate hardware ADP.
c. Equipment Logs. An Equipment Log was prepared and
maintained for each major hardware component, subsystem, and system
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to document the continuous history of the item. Entries included, but
were not limited to, the following: 1) date of entry, 2) identity of
test or inspection, 3) environmental conditions, 4) characteristics
investigated, 5) parameter measurements, 6) identity of instrumentation
used and calibration dates, 7) record of all storage, operating, and
test times, and listing of time/cycle critical items, 8) cumulative
number of duty cycles, 9) discrepancies, 10) repair and maintenance
records, 11) record of pertinent unusual or questionable occurrences,
12) action taken to formalize quick fixes, 13) identity of individual
making entry. The equipment logs, as part of the ADP, were available
at all times for inspection and review with the equipment.
d. Failure and Unsatisfactory Condition (UC) Reports.
Failure and UC Reports were prepared by the developer for any. failure
where a system, subsystem, component or part was unable to perform its
required function under the specified conditions for the specified
duration. Each report contained the part number, name of part, serial
number, part manufacturer, date problem was first detected, test being
conducted when the problem occurred, conditions at time of problem,
problem description, problem cause (if known), and any other informa-
tion considered pertinent.
e. Failure Analysis and Corrective Action Reports.
Failure Analysis and Corrective Action Reports were prepared by the
developer for each reported failure. Each report referenced the Failure
Report, defined the method of analysis, documented the results, defined
the action(s) necessary to prevent recurrence of the failure, and
included justification for the selected action. If the proposed cor-
rective action required a change to the baseline configuration, the
failure analysis and proposed corrective action were submitted with
an ECP. After approval of the change proposal, the approved Failure
Analysis and Corrective Action Report was submitted, indicating the
need for reverification and containing provisions for signature close-
out of the item.
4. Reliability Documents.
a. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Reports. FMEA
reports were prepared for each end item to identify critical failure
areas and remove susceptibility to such failures. These analyses were
performed on each component of the end item and each potential failure
was categorized according to its probability of occurrence and conse-
quent effect oni mission success (see Criticality Categories, Section
X). These reports served as an aid in proportioning the effort
required for corrective design action and reliability control. Each
report included a Single Failure Point Summary, a Hazards Summary and
Reliability Logic Block Diagrams. The single failure point summary
summarized all Category 1 and 2 single-point failure modes by identi-
fying the: 1) item name, 2) failure mode, 3) effect of failure upon
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the system, 4) criticality of the failure, 5) means of detection,
6) required corrective action, and 7) justification or rationale of
acceptance if corrective action was not implemented. The Hazards
Summary identified and categorized catastrophic or critical hazards
in environment, hardware, test, training, operational procedures and
interface conditions and discussed steps to relieve these hazards.
The Reliability Logic Block Diagrams showed the functional inter-
dependencies among the system components so that the effects of a
functional failure could be readily traced through the system. All
redundancies or other means for preventing failure effects were shown
as functional blocks or notes.
b. Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical Parts
List. An EEE Parts List was prepared to identify all EEE parts in
use, and included as a minimum the following: 1) generic part, type,
name and number, 2) common designation, 3) manufacturer's name,
4) manufacturer's part number, 5) package type, 6) specification name
and number, 7) quantities used per replaceable assembly and identifi-
cation of replaceable assembly, 8) limited life part restrictions,
and 9) qualification methods and status.
c. Materials List. A Materials List was prepared, identi-
fying all nonmetallic materials in use, and also containing a summary
of metallic materials used that reflected any recognized flammability,
toxicity or odor hazards inherent in the design through use of metal-
lic materials. The Materials List included as a minimum the following:
1) part number, 2) major assembly part number, 3) generic identifica-
tion, 4) material manufacturer, 5) material specifications, 6) trade
name or commercial name and catalog number, 7) usage category, 8) weight
per usage, 9) exposed surface area, and 10) method of verification and
status.
5. Test Documents
a. Verification Plan. A separate verification plan for
each end item was prepared by the ED and submitted for approval at
the PDR. It defined the verification methods (similarity, analysis,
inspection, demonstration, validation of records, or test) to be used
to verify that the end item met each technical requirement in the EIS.
For requirements to be satisfied by assessment, the plan described the
specific types of analyses, inspections, etc, to be conducted (i.e.,
stress analyses, thermal analyses, radiographic inspections, etc),
defined the objectives of these methods, and identified the documents
that would contain the assessment. When a requirement was to be veri-
fied by tist, the Verification Plan defined: specific tests to be
conducted; vquipmenL components, parts, etc, to be tested; test objec-
tives; locations where Ltests were to be conducted; facilities and
equipment support requirements; and time phasing of the tests. The
test program was to provide only the minimum tests necessary, based
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on the criticality and complexity of the experiment. The entire
spectrum of tests was analyzed as an integrated effort to minimize
test requirements and prevent duplication. Testing was conducted at
the highest feasible level of hardware assembly. For very simple
experiments, the test plan, specification and procedure could be com-
bined into the same document.
b. Test Specifications. A Test Specification was pre-
pared by the ED for each type of test defined in the Verification Plan.
Each specification included, as applicable: test item nomenclature and
identification; test objectives; quantity to be tested; test parameters
or performance criteria, with limits or tolerances; acceptance and re-
jection criteria; environmental conditions; hazardous operations or
situations; reference to applicable safety standards, rules and regula-
tions; allowable adjustment or maintenance operations; requirements for
data recording, analysis, retest and reporting of test results; and
test article disposition.
c. Test Procedures. Test Procedures were prepared by the
ED for each type of inspection and test defined in his test specifica-
tions. The Test Procedures prescribed steps to be accomplished in
detail and sequence, test equipment to be used, calibration require-
ments, layout and interconnection of equipment, safety practices (for
equipment and personnel) to be observed and criteria for passing the
test, including tolerances. Development test procedures were not sub-
mitted for approval; however, all other (qualification, acceptance,
etc) procedures were submitted for EDC approval.
d. Test Reports. Test Reports were prepared for each
type of test conducted. Qualification and acceptance test reports
were submitted at the CIR for review of their validity and verifica-
tion of satisfactory tests. The test report contained an evaluation
of test data, a comparison of test results with test objectives and
design and performance requirements, a listing of any associated
failure reports, and conclusions based on the evaluation. The report
in many cases also contained an annotated copy of the actual test
procedure.
e. Calibration Data Reports. Where applicable, a Cali-
bration Data Report was prepared from acceptance test results and
became a part of the ADP. These reports provided the actual calibra-
tion data sheets for each measurement produced or displayed by the
experiment. For each measurement the report included the following:
o Descriptive title of measurement
o Measurement number
o Indicating device part number and serial number
o Component part number and serial number in which the
indicating device was installed
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o Original tabulation of actual calibration data points
o Original graph of calibration data
This information was used for data evaluation during integration testing
and mission data reduction.
6. Development Status Report. A Development Status Report
was prepared by the ED to provide the status of the total development
effort at each program milestone. The report was an integrated effort
covering the development of all the ED's hardware, including GSE. It
included, but was not limited to, the following: 1) schedule status,
2) mass properties status, 3) quality assurance, reliability and system
safety status, 4) spares status, 5) delivery status.
7. Operating, Maintenance and Handling Procedures. The Opera-
ting, Maintenance and Handling (OM&H) procedures were prepared by the
ED and included in the ADP, to define all procedures required during
both flight and ground usage. The procedures contained all instruc-
tions for operation, servicing, maintenance, calibration, handling,
cleaning, storage, packing and shipping. Any limited-life or time-
critical items were identified and replacement cycles defined. The
procedures included all diagrams, exploded views, sketches, text, etc,
necessary to permit efficient procedure accomplishment. They also
clearly indicated any step which, if not correctly followed, would
result in serious injury to personnel or hardware damage, and gave
the reason for such warning. The flight hardware OM&H normally con-
sisted of three volumes. Volume I contained a general description of
the hardware and its interfaces; subsystem functional description,
operational and design characteristics, limitations and restrictions;
and controls and displays. Volume II contained the mission operational
procedures for both normal and contingency operations, in a step-by-
step checklist format that was used by the Mission Operations Center
to prepare detailed checklists for the crew. Volume III contained all
necessary procedures to accomplish ground operations, maintenance and
handling of the hardware (including recovery operations if applicable);
this volume was used by the Module Development and operations centers
to prepare their detailed test and handling procedures.
8. Data Request Form. Thle standard format for the DRF, the
formal instrument for identifying experiment data requirements, is
reproduced in figure A-2. Contents of the various blocks in the DRF
are self-explanatory from their titles.
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DRF ControNo. Dote
DATA REQUEST FORM
Skylob Program Exp Sy o Revision
Mission Period of Interest Op. Need Date Ro Dote
Request Contact Data Recipient Date Req
Name Name
Orgoni zatlon Address Qy
Phone Phone
Reference Documents
MRD Content
Detailed Requirements:
Comments & Explanations
Originator integrator
None Nane
Organlsoaton Organization
phone phone
I gneture Date Signoture Dote
Request Aproval Implementing Agency
Nom Naomo
Organization Organization
phone phone
SI geotur Dote Signoature Dte
MilC * Form ol (October 1970)
FIGURE A-2. DRF FORMAT
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OF POOR QUALITY
B. Integration Documentation
Integration documents were prepared to assure that the experi-
ment interfaces with the program were satisfactorily provided. Begin-
ning with the experiment concept, the requirements for program inter-
faces were established and systematically compared with program capa-
bilities. Requirement documents were prepared which in turn generated
documents that defined the interfaces or identified how the requirements
were to be satisfied. In general, these documents were prepared by or
under the cognizance of the Integration Center or Module Development
Center. Mission operational documentation, which also involves exten-
sive experiment interfaces, is treated separately in Section C.
1. Compatibility Assessment. When the experiment concept was
originally considered for approval, compatibility analysis was initiated
by the Integration Center. It compared all experiment requirements to
program capabilities and reported the compatible areas as well as incom-
patible areas. Modification of proposed experiment requirements was
often necessary to produce a compatible experiment. After experiment
approval, the compatibility assessment became a recurring integration
document covering total compatibility of all the integrated experiments.
The review of major problems identified in the compatibility assessment
was supplemented by bimonthly management review meetings held by the
Integration Center and attended by representatives of the other centers
involved. At these reviews, the status of the problems was presented,
a plan agreed to for their solution, and action items assigned (see
Appendix B).
2. Experiment Requirements Document. After the experiment was
approved, the EDC (or in some cases the Integration Center) prepared an
ERD to specify the experiment requirements for module and program inter-
faces. These interfaces could be of a physical nature (electrical,
data, control, crew, thermal, mechanical, stowage, etc).or program
interfaces (integration test requirements, number of mission data takes,
recovery requirements, etc). The ERD was approved by the EDC and became
a Level II baseline document following experiment and module PRRs. As
the program proceeded, various ERD requirements became formalized in
other Level II documents such as ICDs, TCRSDs, and MRD, and were de-
leted from the ERD to avoid redundancy. Table A-II presents the stan-
dardized ERD outline, as prescribed by an intercenter "ERD Instructions"
document.
3. Cluster Requirements Specification. Since Skylab involved
several modules, an overall integration specification for the assembled
modules (cluster) was found necessary. This document, prepared by the
Integration Center, was identified as the Cluster Requirements Specifi-
cation (CRS), and amplified the general performance and design integra-
tion requirements of the Skylab Program Specification to ensure that
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TABLE A-II. EXPERIMENT REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT OUTLINE
1. EXPERIMENT DESCRIPTION
1.1 Objective
1.2 Concept
1.3 Experiment Description and Function
1.3.1 Experiment Equipment List
1.3.2 Additional Supporting Equipment
1.4 Relation to Other Experiments
1.5 Cluster Requirements Imposed on Experiment
2. MISSION ASSIGNMENT AND HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS
2.1 Flight Assignment
2.2 Location Assignment
2.3 Hardware Requirements (Number and types of experiment end
items)
3. DATA REQUIREMENTS
3.1 Preflight Data Requirements
3.2 In-flight Data Requirements
3.2.1 Experiment Measurement List
3.2.2 Spacecraft Systems Measurement List (Housekeeping)
3.2.3 Photographic Data Requirements
3.2.4 Other In-flight Data Requirements
3.3 Postflight Data Requirements
3.4 Data Return Requirements
3.5 Special Handling Requirements
3.6 Analysis and Processing Support
4. FLIGHT VEHICLE SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS
4.1 Structural and Mechanical Requirements
4.1.1 Weight and Volume
4.1.2 Dimensional Sketches
4.1.2.1 Stowed
4.1.2.2 Operational
4.1.2.3 Post-Operational
4.1.3 Mounting, Alignment and Orientation Requirements
4.1.4 System and Equipment Modifications
4.1.5 Plumbing Requirements
4.1.6 Fluid Requirements (Gaseous and Liquid)
4.1.7 Accessibility Requirements
4.1.8 Observation Access Requirements
4.2 Environmental Requirements
4.2.1 Thermal Requirements
4.2.2 Atmosphere Requirements
4.2.3 Radiation Requirements
4.2.4 Lighting Requirements
4.2.5 Other Environmental Constraints
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TABLE A-II. EXPERIMENT REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT OUTLINE (CONTINUED)
4. FLIGHT VEHICLE SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS (CONTINUED)
4.3 Electrical Requirements
4.3.1 Power and Voltage Requirements
4.3.2 Power Profile
4.3.3 Other Power Characteristics
4.4 Instrumentation and Communications Requirements
4.4.1 Telemetry System Requirements
4.4.2 Timing System Requirements
4.4.3 Ground Command Requirements
4.4.4 Voice Communication Requirements
4.4.5 Displays and Controls Requirements
4.5 Interface Requirements
4.5.1 Interface Schematic
4.5.2 Interface Identification
4.5.3 Existing Hardware Interfaces
4.6 Expendable Equipment Disposal
5. EXPERIMENT AND FLIGHT VEHICLE POINTING REQUIREMENTS
5.1 Experiment.Pointing Requirements
5.1.1 Target Description
5.1.2 Experiment Pointing Accuracy
5.1.3 Allowable Experiment Rates
5.1.4 Number of Performances
5.1.5 Duration of Each Performance
5.1.6 Time of Each Performance
5.2 Flight Vehicle Pointing Requirements
5.2.1 Orbit Requirements
5.2.2 Spacecraft Orbital Location During Each Performance
5.2.3 Reference Orientation
5.2.4 Spacecraft Pointing Accuracy
5.2.5 Allowable Spacecraft Rates
5.2.6 Allowable Spacecraft Acceleration
5.2.7 Spacecraft Maneuvers Required
6. FLIGHT CREW OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS
6.1 Experiment Preparation Requirements
6.2 Experiment Operation Requirements
6.3 Post Operation Tasks
6.4 Operation Schedule Constraints
6.5 Crew Training Requirements
6.6 In-flight Maintenance Requirements
7. FLIGHT OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS
7.1 Flight Support Requirements
7.1.1 Command List
7.1.2 Support Requirements
7.2 Recovery Support Requirements
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TABLE A-II. EXPERIMENT REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT OUTLINE (CONTINUED)
8. POSTACCEPTANCE TESTING
8.1 Experiment/Module Integration Test and Checkout
8.1.1 Receiving, Inspection and Handling
8.1.2 Ground Personnel Participation
8.1.3 Integrated Test
8.1.3.1 Test Types
8.1.3.2 Test Locations
8.1.4 Facilities
8.1.5 Data Recording
8.1.6 Ground Support Equipment/Test Equipment
8.1.7 Services
8.1.8 Special Test Constraints
8.2 Prelaunch Checkout
8.2.1 Receiving, Inspection, and Handling
8.2.2 Ground Personnel Participation
8.2.3 Prelaunch Test and Activities
8.2.3.1 Test and Activity Types
8.2.3.2 Equipment Utilization
8.2.4 Facilities
8.2.5 Data Recording
8.2.6 Ground Support Equipment/Test Equipment
8.2.7 Services
8.2.8 Special Test Constraints
8.3 Ground Personnel Training Requirements
9. RESUPPLY AND REACTIVATION REQUIREMENTS
9.1 Orbital Storage Requirements
9.2 Resupply Equipment and Materials
9.3 Reactivation Procedures
9.4 Special Requirements
10. REPORTS OF EXPERIMENT RESULTS
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all hardware would successfully function as an integrated system to
accomplish mission objectives. In addition to the general requirements,
the CRS addressed some specific requirements for primary functional
areas (i.e., structural, attitude control, electrical, control and dis-
play, communications and data, environmental control, crew, and caution
and warning flight systems; ground systems; and payload requirements
imposed on the launch vehicle). It also provided a comprehensive list-
ing and description of all approved deviations to its technical require-
ments.
4. Interface Control Documents. Once experiment requirements
had been baselined, immediate attention was given to providing the
interface details. These details were documented by the Module Develop-
ment Center in ICDs. Preliminary ICDs were reviewed and baselined at
the experiment PDR. Three basic types of ICD were prepared for each
experiment:
o Mechanical/Environmental (weight, center of gravity,
attachment provisions, structural loads, thermal
environment, etc - see Table A-III);
o Electrical (type of power, connectors, pin assignments,
wire sizes, etc - see Table A-IV);
o Instrumentation and Communication (number of data
measurements, type, sample rate, etc - see Table A-V).
In addition to the experiment-to-module ICDs, GSE and facility ICDs
were also prepared as necessary to define the experiment-to-GSE
and GSE-to-facility interface requirements.
5. Module Specifications and Documents. Paralleling the
experiment documentation, the Module Development Center prepared a
Module End Item Specification, module FMEA, and various other inte-
gration documents that incorporated experiment information. Typical
of the latter were: the module Power Allocation Document, which inte-
grated the electrical power requirements of the module systems and its
installed experiments; module Measurements Lists, which identified and
defined the instrumentation and communications services provided by
the module; module Critical Items List (CIL), which summarized all
Category 1 and 2 critical items within the module, including those
identified for experiments; etc.
6. Experiment Integration Test Requirements and Specifications.
As described in Section V.C, the Integration Center coordinated prepara-
tion of an EITRS document which compiled postacceptance test require-
ments of all the experiments, and provided source information for the
module and integrated system TCRSDs. Figure A-3 shows the format of a
typical EITRS page.
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PARA CONSIDERATIONS AND EFFECTIVITY
TEST CRITERIA AND SPECIFICATION CONSTRAINTS M se
4.24.3.2.- Verify the operation of the Flammability Timing ELLPSED light illuminates after 10 seconds. With:
6.4 circuits. SEONDS "10' 
X I
4.24.3.2.- Verify the operation of the FLAMMABILITY READY READY light illuminates. With:
6.5 function. READY/R SET READY X
4.24.3.2.- Verify the operation of the FLAIKABILITY Data Caera C signal indication at camera with:
6.6 Start function. intelfaces, Flood Light illuminates, and DATA START ".I I
28 + VDC at igniter for approximately (lamentary)
3 seconds.
After approximately 10 seconds elapsed
light flashes and Flood Light flashes.
4.24.3.2.- Verify that proper water pressure and flow rate Capable of flowing water. GSE required. 
I
6.7 is provided by M512 for H479.
4.24.3.3 Deleted
4.24.3.4 Verify the pressure in the MPF. Work Chamber CH2 pressure: 4.5 + 0.5 PSIA This will require backfilling Xthe Work Chamber.
High Voltage electronics section pressure.
Perfluoral propane @25 + 1.0 PSIA
4.24.3.5 Verify Crystal Growth Storage Container At Crystal Growth Storage Container At HAR, Flight Qualifiable I X
power to container. Test connector 28 +2 DC Growth Storage 
Container
required.
At KSC, Flight Unit required
for VAB Test prior to closeout.
4.24.3.6 Verify OI T~"I notify Pl light function ID illuminates ID MW/MIP 
TEST switch to I I
O O LaMP TEST
4.24.3.7 Verify the operation of the Battery Discharge DICHA R illuminates. Main Battery Circuit Breaker ON X X
Indicator Light. 0.90 + 0.05 AMP discharge Battery Discharge CircuitRE A-Breaer (SAMPLE
FIGURE A-3. EITRS FORM&T (SANLE)
TABLE A-III. MECHANICAL/ENVIRONMENTAL ICD OUTLINE
1.0 Scope
2.0 Applicable Documents
3.0 Requirements
3.1 Functional Requirements
3.1.1 Environmental
3.1.1.1 Spacecraft/Launch Vehicle Imposed Environments
3.1.1.2 Experiment Required Environments
3.1.1.3 Experiment Imposed Environments
3.1.2 Interface Loads
(Maximum Loads at the Attachment Interface)
3.1.3 Mass Properties
(Weight, Moment of Inertia, Center of Gravity)
3.2 Procedural Requirements (If Applicable)
3.3 Physical Requirements
3.3.1 Mechanical (Drawing showing Structural Interface)
3.3.2 Envelope
3.3.3 Axes Definition
3.3.4 Alignment
TABLE A-IV. ELECTRICAL ICD OUTLINE
1.0 Scope
2.0 Applicable Documents
3.0 Requirements
3.1 General
3.1.1 Abbreviations
3.1.2 Terminology
3.1.3 Electrical Characteristics
3.2 Interface Wiring
3.2.1 Connector Designations
3.2.2 Cable Pin Functions
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TABLE A-V. INSTRUMENTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS ICD OUTLINE
1.0 Scope
2.0 Applicable Documents
3.0 Requirements
3.1 Telemetry
3.1.1 Data Signal Characteristics
3.1.1.1 Analog Measurements
3.1.1.2 Digital Measurements
3.1.2 Signal Conditioning
3.2 Commands
3.3 Timing
3.4 Correlation Data - (Measurement originating outside
experiment, required during course of experiment operation.)
3.5 Electromagnetic Compatibility
3.5.1 Bonding
7. Test and Checkout Requirements and Specifications Documents.
The module TCRSDs and the integrated system TCRSD were prepared by the
Module Development Center and Integration Center. These TCRSDs defined
the module and system acceptance requirements, specification criteria
and constraints to be used in preparing the test procedures. The TCRSDs
utilized the EITRS as the basis for experiment test requirements. The
module TCRSDs were utilized at the module contractor's and launch sites.
The integrated system TCRSD was used only at the launch site. The TCRSD
format was the same as the EITRS without the effectivity columns.
8. Test Procedures. Module and integrated system testing was
performed in accordance with detailed test procedures written by the
Module Development Center or the Launch Center to satisfy the require-
ments and specifications of the TCRSDs. The procedures contained a
description of the test, test configuration, special test requirements,
data requirements, test evaluation, and step-by-step test performance
instructions. For experiment operating details, the OM&H manual de-
livered with the experiment ADP was used. The EDC supported final
preparation of these procedures by reviewing them prior to the test.
An addendum to the test procedure contained a listing of all test
anomalies, anomaly descriptions, troubleshooting steps and corrective
action taken.
9. Installation and Removal Procedures. Based upon the experi-
ment OM&H manual, module integration plans and the ERD, the Module De-
velopment Center also prepared documents for handling, installing, and
removing the experiments. These procedures contained, for each site,
the environmental and handling constraints, drawings necessary for
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showing complex processes (loading film, installing experiments, etc.),
detailed steps for performing installation, removal and refurbishment,
reference to all GSE/Facility ICDs, and a list of all GSE required.
C. Mission Operational Documentation
1. Operations Directive (Program Directive No. 43). A series
of formal directives was issued by the Program Director, and controlled
at Level I, to amplify the Program Specification requirements in specific
areas. Program Directive No. 43 officially identified program objectives,
policies and requirements; described the various Skylab missions, their
specific objectives and requirements; and identified mission assignments
and scheduling instructions for the individual experiments.
2. Mission Requirements Document. The MRD provided the basis
for mission planning and design. It was prepared by the Mission Opera-
tions Center, based upon the Program Specification, Operations Directive,
ERDs, and Experiment OM&H manuals. It defined the integrated functional
and performance requirements to achieve program and mission objectives.
Many subsidiary mission documents were prepared to implement the MRD
requirements. These documents could expand upon, but could not conflict
with the MRD contents.
The MRD contained a definition of the mission objectives, a
mission profile description, launch date(s), orbital parameters and
vehicle attitude capabilities. General ground rules relating to in-
flight operations were prescribed for use in flight planning. The MRD
also defined, for each experiment, the detailed test objectives (DTOs),
requirements, test conditions and types of data required for experiment
accomplishment. The test conditions described the environmental limi-
tations, pointing requirements, vehicle attitude stability, electrical
tolerances and all other constraints pertinent to experiment operation.
The MRD was updated and expanded in periodic review cycles,
under Level II change control.
3. Flight Plan. The Flight Plan, prepared by the Mission
Operations Center, was a detailed schedule of all in-flight crew
activities. It responded directly to the MRD and endeavored to satisfy
all requirements and constraints specified therein. The scheduled
activities for each crewman were laid out relative to a time base,
using operation times which had been verified during crew training
sessions. In addition, the summary timeline format (see figure A-4)
provided a simultaneous display of related data such as day and night
periods, beta angle, ground station contact times, vent times and tape
recorder usage.
The graphical presentation utilized in the Flight Plan facili-
tated the identification of conflicting requirements and constraint
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violations. Although not under formal change control, the Flight Plan
was under continual revision, and each publication was widely distri-
buted for review and comment. The information required to produce the
Flight Plan was updated as required and stored in a data bank for use
during the mission in the computer-controlled, real-time Flight Plan
generation.
4. Stowage List. Stowage lists were compiled and maintained
by the Mission Operations Center to identify and track the proper loca-
tion of all moveable equipment in the Skylab modules throughout the
mission(s). The lists highlighted the article's identification, weight,
cumulative quantities launched and returned, and the planned stowage
locations for launch, in-flight transfer, and return. A sample Stowage
List format is reproduced as figure A-5.
5. Flight Mission Rules. The Flight Mission Rules were a com-
pilation of preplanned responses to possible in-flight contingencies.
They were prepared before the missions, and attempted to anticipate
anomalies which might occur during flight, together with appropriate
corrective actions. These rules were designed to reduce the response
time required to cope with anomalous situations during the mission.
They were crucially important in those instances where a particular
malfunction might compromise crew or vehicle safety, thereby demanding
immediate action. In less urgent circumstances, they assumed an ad-
visory role, describing the previously agreed-upon action to be followed
after the anomaly's criticality had been determined (see Malfunction
Procedures, item 8 below).
6. Experiment Operations Handbook. The EOH was published in
two volumes. Volume I was system oriented and provided experiment
descriptions. Volume II contained detailed normal, backup, and mal-
function operational procedures for these experiments. As such, this
document provided the preliminary input for crew training purposes and,
with feedback from training, formed the basis for the crew checklists.
7. Crew Checklists. The crew experiment checklists were
detailed, step-by-step procedures to be followed for proper experiment
operation, included in the onboard Flight Data File. The MRD, experi-
ment OM&H, acceptance and integration test results, EOH, and crew
training experience were the principal inputs for these documents.
They were updated as required during the mission by the ground support
crew at the Mission Operations Center (e.g., to provide specific co-
ordinates of an experiment target).
8. Malfunction Procedures. The nature of space flight experi-
mentation dumands that experiment hardware possess a high reliability.
During the development stage, every effort was made to ensure that the
possibility of an in-flight hardware malfunction was negligible. De-
spite this, experience has shown that failures will occur. A major
advantage of manned space flight is the crewman's ability to repair
78'
SKYLAB PROGRAM PAGE
SL-1 SL-1/2 SL-1/3 SL-1/4 DATE
OPERATIONAL AND EXPERIMENTAL GFE/CFE STOWAGE LIST
UNIT UNIT TOTAL STOVAGE LOCATION
NOMENCLATURE SPEC ESTIACT FLIGHT REMARKS
ITEM WEIGHT WEIGHTCODE T SL 1,2 SL 1 3 SL 1/4
ITEM NO. CAT SUPPL (LB) tLBI
BY LAUNCH REFER TO
PART NUMBER (DIMENSIONS-INCHES) RETURN R L O R NOTES SECTION
TOTAL ITEMS I
E E  E FO
LAUNCHED AN FLARIFICATION
0199.00.o00-OS AUTOMATIC TIMER FCID5 2.100 2.085/A L 9 RETURNED R IC) REFERENCE 011/ (1.00XI.05X0.50) R 4
-GTE SEB1234-1 j -
CFE MDA 1 4 5 5 5 5
M108 M108 M108 M108 M108 M108
MIZE SSTOWD 3
V-WORN- USE
O:0PERATIONAL M-MIXED END ITEM -L 1/3 AND 1/4;NO ADDITIONAL ITEMS ARE
E-EXPERIMENTAL SPECIFICATION 1 AUNCHED, BUT THE ITEM STOWED IN THE US
BLANK-MIXED ASA ORGANIZATION EIGHT COMPARED NOTE OCKER D426 IS TRANSFERRED TO THE MDA
R CONTRACTOR TO LATEST ACTUAL 3 OCKER M108 DURING THE ORBITAL PHASE OF
UPPLYING THE ITEM OR ESTIMATED WEIGHT w /3, AND REMAINS IN THAT LOCATION FOR
(SEE APPENDIX B) (/A OR /E) AND 1 1 1 HE DURATION OF THE PROGRAM.
DIMENSIONS PER D426 0426 D426
LAUNCH ASSEMBLY/ LATEST AVAILABLE DATA
SUBASSEMBLY STOWAGE (SEE NOTES 2 AND 3 ON
PROVISION INDICATOR NEXT PAGE FOR
(SEE NOTE 1,NEXT PAGE) GROUNDRULES)
SL 1'2 RETURN CONFIGURATION;FOUR ITEMS
ARE LEFT IN ORBIT IN THE MDA LOCKER
MI08, AND ONE ITEM REMAINS IN THE VS
SL 1/2 LAUNCH CONFIGURATION; LOCKER D426. THREE ITEMS ARE RETURNED
CNE ITEM LAUNCHED IN THE VS WOR IN THE CM, AND ONE ITEM IS STOWED
IN SUBCONTAINER A1 WITHIN IN LOCKER B.
LOCKER D426, FIVE LAUNCHED IN 7
IN LOCKER BS, AND THREE ARE T TYI ONFGURATION;
ORN IN THE CH. ALL EIGHT ITEMS ARE TRANSFERRED
OUT OF THE CM, FOUR INTO THE NDA
WHERE ONE IS STOWED IN LOCKER
S108 AND THREE ARE PUT INTO USE,
AND FOUR INTO THE VS WHERE THREE
ARE WORN AND ONE IS CLIPPED TO
L-4 THE FILM VAULT PER THE NOTE--USED
IN LIEU OF A LOCKER LOCATION. THE
c ONE ITEM LAUNCHED IN SUBCONTAINER
Al WITHIN D426 REMAINS IN THE LOCKER_
NOTES: 011 CLIPPED TO SIDE OF FILM VAULT DURING MISSION 1/2 ACTIVE ORBITAL PHASE X022
FIGURE A-5. STOWAGE LIST FORMAT (SAMPLE)
or work around many failures. The Malfunction Procedures, included in
the onboard Flight Data File, provided the crew with logical steps to
be followed when anomalies occurred. These procedures, expressed in
block diagram format, were designed to rapidly isolate the anomaly to
the subsystem or component which had failed and, where possible and
applicable, described a repair method or alternate procedure which
would permit continued operation. In the event that the malfunction
procedure did not result in a satisfactory repair, the applicable mis-
sion rule was invoked.
9. Operational Data Book. During the mission, there may be
occasions when the limit of certain design tolerances may be approached
or exceeded, necessitating appropriate action. The ODB was a compila-
tion of the operational performance data and limitations of all vehicle
and experiment hardware. From the experimenter it required a descrip-
tion of the mass properties, structure and dynamics of the equipment,
the effect of experiment operation on the spacecraft environment, the
nature of the load it presented to the electrical power system, data
instrumentation requirements, experiment pointing capabilities and all
operational limitations and hardware constraints.
10. Skylab Experiment Systems Handbook. The SESH was a com-
pilation of experiment functional flow diagrams and, where applicable,
mechanical and electrical schematics, for use by the flight controllers
during the missions. It was designed to assist in the rapid resolu-
tion of real-time experiment anomalies. Pertinent operational and
system constraints were identified, as were the interfaces between
experiments, where applicable.
11. Facility Users Handbook. As part of an Announcement of
Flight Opportunity, advising the scientific community of the availa-
bility of an experiment facility (e.g., EREP), a Facility Users Hand-
book was prepared by the Experiment Development Center for distribu-
tion to potential users. The handbook identified the physical/func-
tional characteristics and operational capabilities of the facility
and its individual instruments.
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COMPATIBILITY ASSESSMENT
A major feature of Skylab experiment integration activities was
the continuing compatibility assessment performed by the Integration
Center. This activity assumed various forms as the program developed.
During the program's formative stages, when many different
missions and configurations were being considered, an extensive assess-
ment was conducted to categorize over five hundred available or potential
experiments into compatible, discipline-oriented payload groupings for
performance on particular types of missions. While the early concept
of numerous dedicated missions did not survive, these assessments were
influential in selecting the initial experiment complement for the con-
figuration and missions that were implemented.
Subsequently, as new experiments were proposed for MSFEB con-
sideration, an initial compatibility assessment was necessary in each
case, to evaluate the impacts of the experiment requirements upon all
other hardware and operational aspects of the program. Any incompati-
bilities identified were resolved before the experiment was approved
for implementation.
Thereafter, a continuing surveillance was maintained of all per-
tinent program documentation, information and activities to assure that
the experiment requirements and constraints remained compatible with
all interfacing cluster and module systems and operationalplans.
Where incompatibilities were identified, the Integration Center coor-
dinated and participated in their resolution. All involved agencies
(PI, ED, EDC, Module Developer/Development Center, operations centers,
etc., as applicable) were consulted and mutually acceptable solutions
established. Normally, the Integration Center prepared and "precoor-
dinated" any necessary change package for submittal to the cognizant
CCB (see Section I) and maintained corrective action implementation
status. When significant hardware changes were involved, the affected
hardware developer was responsible for preparation of the ECP.
Many special studies were also conducted to assess the compati-
bility of associated groups of experiments with their common module
interfaces. Some examples were: multi-experiment usage of the Scien-
tific Airlocks, module provisions for storage and environmental pro-
tection of assorted experiment photographic film, launch pad access
requirements for experiments, etc.
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The various compatibility assessment activities continued at a
high level throughout the definition, development, and integration
phases, and as a monitoring and evaluation function during the mission
support phase. Table B-I identifies and defines the general scope of
the 17 experiment compatibility disciplines that were initially checked
and subsequently monitored for these assessments. Figure B-1 presents
a matrix of the pertinent program documentation that was continually
reviewed in the various discipline areas.
Management visibility of the experiment compatibility status
was provided by oral presentation of bimonthly reviews, and by broad
dissemination of a monthly Experiment Compatibility Status Report.
Representatives of the module development, launch, and mission opera-
tions centers attended the bimonthly reviews and received the status
report. A key feature of the monthly report was a compatibility summary
of the status of each individual experiment relative to each of the 17
compatibility disciplines (see figure B-2). The summary was supplemented
in the report by detailed descriptions of current problem areas and their
resolution status, including action items and suspense dates where
applicable (see figure B-3). Once entered, problems could be closed
and deleted from the status report only by issuance of a CCBD correct-
ing the incompatibility, or by some equivalent positive action accept-
able to the Integration Center.
The evolution of these integration techniques provided a very
effective means for the timely control of Skylab experiment compati-
bility.
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TABLE. B-I EXPERIMENT COMPATIBILITY DISCIPLINES
DISCIPLINE DEFINITION
Mechanical Verification that experiment mechanical interface re-
quirements are met for mounting, alignment, orienta-
tion, plumbing, venting, sealing, and the use of
observation windows.
Weight and Verification of current experiment weights relative
Stowage to experiment and module control weights; of experi-
ment stowage provisions in terms of weight, volume,
and location for each launch, orbital storage and
return operation in the mission; and that all onboard
experiment support equipment is available at the time
and in the quantities required.
Consumables Verification that experiment requirements for oxygen,
nitrogen, water, and/or other consumables will be
supplied either by the modules or by the experiments
themselves.
Electrical Verification that experiments are compatible with
the electrical power provided by the module (voltage
tolerances, power profile, and total energy); that
all electrical interfaces are compatible (connectors,
cables, etc.); and that EMI produced in the electri-
cal system will not cause unacceptable degradation
of the system or experiments.
Instrumentation Verification that experiment measurements, house-
and keeping measurements, voice communication, and ground
Communications commands required for the experiments will be provided;
that experiment equipment, data formats, and data rates
will be compatible with module requirements for record-
ing and transmission to ground, and with MMC require-
ments for processing and display; that all data
correlation requirements (e.g., time, ephemeris, etc.)
will be provided for; and that experiment-required
data will not be lost due to EMI.
Environments Verification of experiment compatibility with prelaunch,
launch, orbital and recovery environments (temperature,
humidity, pressure, acoustic, vibration, acceleration,
shock, radiation, illumination) as specified in the
CRS or defined by NASA-recognized analyses; and of crew
and system compatibility with experiment-induced en-
vironments.
Materials Verification that experiment materials are acceptable
in accordance with the appropriate specifications as
referenced in the CRS, or that waivers to these spec-
ifications have been approved.
84
TABLE B-I EXPERIMENT COMPATIBILITY DISCIPLINES (Cont.)
DISCIPLINE DEFINITION
Contamination Evaluation of experiment susceptibility to contamina-
tion from internal or external sources; determination
of contamination produced by the experiments; and
verification of ground contamination control procedures.
Photography Verification that experiment photographic requirements
are met, including photographic support equipment
(cameras, lenses, light, cables, etc.) and film; and
that adequate environmental protection is provided
for film.
Experiment Verification that experiment pointing requirements
and Spacecraft will be met when integrated into the spacecraft; and
Pointing that requirements imposed on the spacecraft, including
orbit position for performance, orientation, stability,
allowable rates and accelerations, and the necessary
maneuvers, will be provided for.
Safety Verification of experiment safety plans and provisions
for on-orbit operations.
Systems Test Verification of compatibility of all experiment handling,
test and checkout plans with integration test planning,
prelaunch maintenance, logistics, pad access, and launch
constraints.
Ground Support Verification that GSE and facilities provided will
Equipment, Facil- satisfy the experiment postacceptance handling and
ities and Handling testing requirements with minimum duplication.
Flight Verification of flight plan compatibility with experi-
Plans ment requirements, priorities, objectives, constraints,
and interfaces.
Crew Verification of experiment-to-crew interfaces, includ-
Interfaces ing in-flight access, restraints and aids, controls and
displays, in-flight maintenance, and crew training.
Mission Verification of plans for obtaining required evalua-
Support tion data; for processing, display, analysis, and
reporting of this data in support of the mission;
and for analysis and reporting after.the mission.
Schedules and Verification and comparison'of required dates and
Hardware Status delivery dates for experiment mock-ups, trainers,
flight hardware (including backup unit), and GSE.
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Experiment Compatibility Problem Areas (Contd)
ACTION ASSIGN- COMPLE-
PROBLEM EXPERI- RESPONSI- MENT TION
NUMBER MENT(S) INCOMPATIBILITY BILITY DATE DATE CURRENT STATUS
24 S019 This experiment uses The S019 PI has decided
triacetate base film. to use film type 101-06.
ESTAR base film is This change was approved
less flammable, by CCBDs 800-72-0586,
exhibits much better 10-9-72, and 2X0223,
physical character- 8-11-72.
istics (especially PROBLEM CLOSED.
with regard to out-
gassing), and is
available in
thinner bases.
*25 T027/ The Photometer Tri- SL-SW 10-11-72 TBD Phase I DCR RID TO27P-4
S073 pod has not been recommended Qual Test to
S149 qualified to launch launch vibration levels
PCTVS vibration levels and and 100 setup/takedown
has not been cycle cycles. The recommended
tested. In addition, RID action has not been
several expando pins taken. In lieu of the
and one floor insert above testing, Memo S&E-
were broken during ASTN-DIR(72-385), 10-11-
operational tests 72, requests a repair (or
at MDAC-W. spare) kit to provide for
continued use of the tri-
pod in the event of damage
to expando pins, bolt
assemblies or floor in-
serts. ECRe in preparation
by S&E-ASTN-SMD and -SDI
to add the spares.
* Problem newly added in this issue of report.
FIGURE B-3. COMPATIBILITY PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND STATUS (SAMPLE)
APPENDIX C
DEVELOPMENT REVIEWS AND CERTIFICATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
DEVELOPMENT REVIEWS AND CERTIFICATION . ...... ....... 90
A. Purpose and Scope of Reviews . .......... 90
1. Preliminary Requirements Review ........ 90
2. Preliminary Design Review . ...... . . . . 91
3. Critical Design Review ........... . 92
4. Configuration Inspection Review . ....... . 92
5. Certification of Flight Worthiness ..... . 93
B. Review Format and Activities . ..... . . . . . 95
1. Preparations ................. 95
2. Technical Review ............... 96
3. Preboard Action ......... .. . . . . . 98
4. Review Board Action ...... ....... . 98
5. Follow-up Action ..... ... ...... . 98
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure Title
C-1 MSFC RID Format ... ........ .. .. . . 97
89
DEVELOPMENT REVIEWS AND CERTIFICATION
This Appendix describes the requirements, responsibilities and
methodology for accomplishment of the formal reviews and certifications
which were key development checkpoints for Skylab experiments. The
seven key management checkpoints established by Skylab Program Directive
No. 11 were:
PRR - Preliminary Requirements Review
PDR - Preliminary Design Review
CDR - Critical Design Review
CIR - Configuration Inspection Review
COFW - Certification of Flight Worthiness
DCR - Design Certification Review
FRR - Flight Readiness Review
The Experiment Development Center was responsible for accomplishment of
the first five of these (PRR, PDR, CDR, CIR and COFW) at selected end
item levels. The last two reviews (DCR and FRR) were program-oriented,
encompassing the total mission complex; they were accomplished through
coordinated efforts of the development, integration, launch, and mission
operations centers, and were conducted in a different format by the NASA
Headquarters Program Director. Experiment involvement in the DCR and
FRR is described in Section VI of the main text.
Each development review was a critical examination of documentation
and pertinent hardware for compliance with program requirements and for
compatibility with related hardware and facilities. The reviews progressed
chronologically from requirements (PRR), to design (PDR, CDR), to hardware
acceptance (CIR) and formal certification (COFW). Each successive check-
point provided a more comprehensive assessment of program accomplishment
as it matured.
A. Purpose and Scope of Reviews
1. Preliminary Requirements Review. The purpose of a PRR was
to verify by formal review the suitability of the conceptual configuration,
and to establish a Program Requirements Baseline that would satisfy the
experiment objectives and provide the basis for preliminary design. Review
material included the experiment proposal, the approved EIP, the Compati-
bility Assessment, the ED's Statement of Work (SOW), and initial versions
of the ERD and EIS. The PRR established:
o A preliminary EIS for the conceptual flight hardware configu-
ration that would be expected to meet mission objectives and
the required schedule.
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o Operational requirements of the experiment on the module,
crew, launch, flight and recovery, as reflected in the
preliminary ERD.
o Required end items and schedule.
o Feasibility and/or development tests required to select
and substantiate design approaches.
Minutes of the PRR were prepared, as described in Section A.2.d of
Appendix A, and included all items requiring post-review action. These
action items were to be completed prior to final approval of the Program
Requirements Baseline.
2. Preliminary Design Review. The purpose of a PDR was to
verify by formal review the basic design approach for the hardware, prior
to proceeding with detail design, and thereby to establish a Design
Requirements Baseline. The PDR established:
o The integrity of the design approach, by review of design
analyses, breadboard models, mock-ups, circuit logic
diagrams, packaging techniques, test and study results,
reliability analyses, etc.
o The compatibility of the design approach with EIS perfor-
mance and design requirements, including interface compati-
bility with other flight hardware, the flight crew, GSE and
facilities. This was accomplished by review of preliminary
design drawings, layout drawings, envelope drawings,
schematics, performance characteristics for functional
compatibility, and available test results.
o The producibility of the design approach with respect to
cost and schedule impact, through the review of requirements
for special tools, equipment, and facilities to manufacture,
inspect and test the hardware.
o The adequacy of the planned test program for the end item,
by review of preliminary test plans.
o The acceptability of the design requirement baseline con-
figuration, through approval of the design approach.
Minutes of the PDR were prepared and included all items requiring post-
review action. These action items were to be completed prior to formal
approval of the Design Requirements Baseline configuration.
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3. Critical Design Review. The purpose of a CDR was to
verify by formal technical review the completed detail design of the
hardware, and to establish a production Drawing Baseline before the
design was released for manufacture. The CDR established:
o The integrity of the completed design, by review of
the drawings (as prepared for release to manufactur-
ing), analyses, mock-ups, qualification status of
selected parts and materials, test data, inspecta-
bility, etc.
o Compatibility of the completed design with EIS per-
formance and design requirements, as revised since
PDR. This included the exact physical and functional
interface relationships with other flight hardware,
the flight crew, GSE and facilities.
o The production baseline configuration for manufacture
of the hardware, through approval of the completed
design and associated documentation.
o Adequacy of the planned test program, by baselining
the Qualification and Acceptance Test Specifications.
o Adequacy of the design from a safety standpoint,
through a review of design details and test results.
o Adequacy of the design for operations, by review of
engineering simulations, tests and study results and
by examination of mock-ups, operating procedures, and
system performance data.
Minutes of the CDR were prepared and included all items re-
quiring post-review action. These action items were to be completed
prior to formal approval of the baseline configuration for manufac-
turing.
4. Configuration Inspection Review. The purpose of a CIR
was to verify by formal technical review that the configuration of
the end item as being offered for delivery was in conformance with
the baseline established at CDR (as modified by approved changes).
This was accomplished by establishing the exact relationship of the
end item as described by released engineering documentation to the
end item as manufactured and assembled. The CIR was most efficiently
conducted in two phases:
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Phase 1 - Approximately one week prior to start of final
experiment hardware acceptance tests, review the
qualification status and test data, configuration
and overall status of the end item and-its GSE.
Phase 2 - Approximately one week prior to delivery, review
the final experiment hardware-acceptance test data.
The CIR established:
o That the hardware to be accepted conformed to the pro-
duction baseline configuration, as documented by the
released engineering, including all approved changes;
and that the configuration of the Qualification Test
hardware corresponded to the configuration of the
flight hardware to be accepted.
o That the test program of the Verification Plan had been
completed and that the verification methods and test
results validated the acceptability of the hardware.
o That all failures occurring after CDR had been reported
and corrective action completed.
o That Failure Mode and Effects Analyses had been com-
pleted and were acceptable.
o That the Acceptance Data Package was complete and
acceptable.
o The validity of the hardware acceptance testing,
verified by a direct comparison of acceptance test
data with EIS performance and design requirements
and by verification that the acceptance tests had
been conducted in accordance with the approved
Acceptance Test Specification and procedures.
o A plan for accomplishing any open work items remain-
ing for fulfillment of the above requirements.
o Identification of all waivers, deviations or
shortages authorized.
The results of the CIR were documented in a CIR Report (see Appendix
A, section A.2.e).
5. Certification of Flight Worthiness. The purpose of the
COFW milestone was to certify that each experiment end item was a com-
plete and qualified item of hardware prior to shipment, and was accom-
panied by adequate supporting documentation. The COFW was prepared
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prior to shipment from the point of manufacture and endorsed by the
EDC. The COFW certified that:
o Complete specifications and drawings had been developed
in accordance with all program requirements. Addition-
ally, that the exact relationship of the hardware as
manufactured and assembled had been established, and
that shortages requiring resolution prior to FRR had
been indicated on the DD-250 form.
o Acceptance, qualification, and any required reliability
demonstration tests had been successfully completed and
had met specification requirements.
o Departures from specification and drawing requirements
had been approved by Material Review Boards in accord-
ance with EIS requirements.
o Critical hardware failures had been reported, analyzed,
and corrected in accordance with EIS requirements.
o The hardware qualification program had been satisfac-
torily accomplished.
o The hardware was complete and in accordance with the EIS.
o Data for operation and checkout was complete and com-
patible.
o Interface Control Document requirements had been met and
interface compatibility was certified;
o Shipping and transportability requirements as stated in
the EIS had been met.
o Delivery status information as required in the EIS was
complete,
o The DD-250 form was ready for signature.
When equipment was shipped to an intermediate destination
(center test facility or developer's plant) for additional work,
further sign-off of the COFW by the cognizant center was required.
Eventually, upon completion of the FRR, the COFW was jointly endorsed
by the Launch Center and the EDC.
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B. Review-Format and Activities
The review description and requirements contained in this
section were generally applicable to all development reviews; however,
flexibility was permitted to meet the requirements of each experiment
review. For example, the formal procedure of using-Review-Item Dis-
crepancy (RID) forms-to document-problem areas-was--properly followed
for major reviews (e.g., for modules or complex experiments), but was
occasionally supplanted by a simple Action Item Log to accomplish the
same purpose in reviews of the less complex experiments.- This -flexi-
bility was implemented by a Review Agenda prepared specifically for
each experiment review by the cognizant EDC.
Review personnel consisted-of: 1) review teams or working
groups, representing each appropriate technical discipline or program
interest, to conduct the detailed technical review; 2) a preboard, to
perform a screening and advisory function; and 3) the review board, to
direct the proceedings and make final disposition of all pertinent re-
view items. The board and preboard normally included representation
from the EDC, NASA Headquarters, the Integration Center, the operations
centers, the ED and the PI or Project Scientist. The designated cap-
tains of the review teams also served on the preboard.
1. Preparations. The cognizant EDC scheduled the review
date(s) and site, and appointed the review board chairman, who in
turn selected his preboard chairman and team captains. Approximately
two months in advance, this group prepared the Review Agenda, notifying
invited participants of review objectives and personnel, session
timing, applicable documents to be made available, and planned devia-
tions from normal review procedures, if any. At least two weeks prior
to PRR, PDR, or CDR, the EDC or ED delivered to each participant a data
package, consisting of updated plans, the appropriate technical documen-
tation, and RID forms. Participants were expected to familiarize them-
selves with the documentation, and identify suspected discrepancies and
problems, in advance preparation for the review.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Apply the following criteria in prepara-
tion for experiment development reviews. For maximum
effectiveness, each review must:
o Be conducted at the appropriate time--in particular,
not prematurely with respect to data definition and
availability.
o Involve the most experienced technical personnel
available to cover all disciplines that affect the
review subject.
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o Limit participants to the required discipline and
project representatives, authorized to act for
their respective organizations (including a single
source of crew comments, consistent from one review
to the next).
o Have a data package that is complete, but minimal
in volume, available to all participants sufficiently
early to permit thorough evaluation.
o Emphasize hardware as available.
o Include assessment of test programs and results.
2. Technical Review. Technical reviews began with a general
technical briefing by the EDC/ED, to provide all review participants
with common background information on development status and technical
requirements and final instructions as to review procedures, criteria,
and guidelines.
Due to the relative complexity of the review materials, indi-
vidual team sessions were scheduled for each applicable technical and
management discipline. The team sessions opened with detailed presen-
tations to assure maximum understanding of the technical materials
subject to review in the team's defined area of responsibility, as
interpreted by the team captain. The remainder of the team sessions
were devoted to in-depth examination and discussion of the review
material, leading to the generation, review and coordination of RIDs,
and development of recommendations for their disposition. The MSFC
standard RID format is shown in figure C-1. The team members sub-
mitted their discrepancies/problems to the team captain to assure
proper format, completeness, clarity, coordination, and that the
content was within scope of the review guidelines and criteria. After
his review the team captain could recommend to the originator that
the RID be withdrawn, rewritten or combined with another RID of the
same intent. However, any action or changes to a RID during the team
meeting and subsequent activities required the concurrence of the
originator. RIDs approved for submittal into the review data flow
were logged, submitted for the developer's response, and coordinated
with other review teams as required. The developer's appointed lead
representative for each team provided or made readily available the
supporting documentation, analyses or explanations required to clarify
or resolve questionable areas encountered during the review. He also
coordinated preparation of the developer's response to submitted RIDs,
provided liaison for coordinating the team's activities with other
teams, and prepared team minutes.
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I. TYPE OF REVIEW: 4. NUMBER:
2. ITEM: REVIEW ITEM DISCREPANCY 5. COoRDINATION:
3. DATE:
6. INITIATOR: 7. ORGANIZATION: 8. SYSTEM: 9. TEAM NAME:
10. TITLE:
11. nISCREPANCY/PROBLEM:
12. JUSTIFICATION:
13. RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION:
14. TEAM CAPTAIN'S SIGNATURE:
15. DEVELOPER'S COMMENT:
16. SIGNATURE:
17. PRE-BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS
17.2 CATEGORY: 17.1 REMARKS:
17.3 ACTION:
17.4 SUSPENSE: 17.5 PRE-BOARD SIGNATURE:
18. FORMAL REVIEW BOARD ACTION
18.3 ACTION: 18.1 , DISAPPROVED
18.2 REMARKS:
18.4 SUSPENSE:
18.5 1 APPROVED
19. DATE: 20. SIGNATURE OF BOARD CHAIRMAN:
MgPC - Form 3254 ( May 1969)
FIGURE C-1. MSFC RID FORMAT
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
3. Preboard Action. The preboard convened, before the board
meeting, to screen and categorize all RIDs submitted by the review
teams. Each RID was considered individually by the preboard, combined
with others where possible, and assigned to one of the following recom-
mended disposition categories:
A. Recommend acceptance as written
B. Recommend acceptance with (stated) modifications
C. Recommend acceptance for study
D. Recommend rejection
E. Refer to board for resolution
The total RID npackage, accompanied by pertinent data to support the
recommendations, was then submitted to the review board for final
disposition.
4. Review Board Action. The board reviewed the RID package
and, after considering the preboard's recommendations, either approved
or disapproved each presented RID. Suspense dates were established
for all items requiring further action. (As noted previously, the
formal RID procedure was replaced in some reviews by a simple Action
Item Log.) The official review minutes (or CIR Report) provided the
formal documentation of the board's actions and directions.
5. Follow-Up Action. The EDC was responsible for assuring
satisfactory review follow-up, i.e., that approved RIDs were imple-
mented, directed studies completed, and appropriate action taken to
close all remaining open items by the prescribed suspense dates.
Upon completion of all required follow-up activity, the final review
minutes were prepared and distributed by the EDC, documenting the
closeout actions and dates, and certifying to the Program Director
that the review objectives had been met.
RECOMMENDATION: Emphasize the importance of adequate
follow-up and formal closeout of all RIDs or review
action items, and timely dissemination of this infor-
mation to all involved program personnel.
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DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
The following experiment design considerations are categorized into
those applicable to flight hardware and those applicable to GSE. These
considerations were usually specified as requirements in either the CRS
or the experiment EIS. Some considerations were only indirectly applic-
able to design (i.e., identifying operational methods or procedures that
might influence the design). The importance of applying these design
criteria was directly related to the criticality category of the experi-
ment, i.e.:
Category 1: Hardware whose failure could adversely
affect personnel safety.
Category 2: Hardware whose failure could result in not
achieving a primary mission objective, but
would not adversely affect personnel safety.
Category 3: Hardware whose failure could result in not
achieving a secondary mission objective, but
which would not adversely affect personnel
safety or preclude the achievement of any
primary mission objective.
Category 4: Hardware whose failure would not result
in any of the above.
A. Flight Hardware
1. Flight Operation, eneral Constraints.
a. Safety of the crew and safe termination of the mission
were overriding design criteria.
b. All components that controlled safety-critical functions
were required to be designed to operate in a vacuum. This was consid-
ered a requirement even for hardware normally located in a pressurized
environment.
c. Efforts were made to minimize the number of single fail-
ure points (SFPs) in the design; rationale to justify acceptance of
those SFPs that did exist was a prime consideration in design and
acceptance reviews. Redundant systems, however, were to be provided
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only if considered necessary to ensure crew safety or primary mission
success.
d. Wherever possible, opportunities for human error were
minimized by designing connecting parts (e.g., fluid line or electrical
connectors that might be reversed in mating) so that they would be
physically incapable of being installed improperly.
e. The experiment was designed to satisfy its own objectives,
independent of the failure of another experiment.
f. Wherever feasible, flight-proven hardware was utilized in
the design.
g. The module generally provided the following subsystems:
1) Data Recording, 2) Power Distribution, 3) Pressurization, 4) Attitude
Control, 5) Voice.Communications, 6) Atmospheric Circulation, 7) Module
Lighting, Food, Water and Waste Management, and 8) Central Caution and
Warning System.
2. Flight Operation Mechanical Constraints
a. All experiment hardware having a crew interface was re-
quired to remain within touch temperature limits of 550F to 105°F.
b. The following types of hardware were required to be
delivered to the Module Development Center:
(1) Mechanical interfaces tool (a tool that could be
used to verify mechanical interfaces prior to installation; e.g., to
locate bolt holes).
(2) One full-scale mock-up of the experiment that, as
a minimum, satisfied mechanical and crew interfaces.
(3) One flight unit.
(4) One complete set of GSE capable of verifying inter-
faces and checking out the experiment to acceptance test requirements.
c. Packaging. Experiment equipment which was stowed during
the launch phase of the mission, and then transferred to a use location,
was required to satisfy the following specifications:
(1) Package limited in size to 20" x 25" x 40" and in
moment of inertia to less than 65 lb-in-sec2 , and allowing adequate
visibility during transfer. [NOTE: Skylab mission experience indi-
cated no difficulty in handling large masses in zero g; however, the
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cross-sectional area of 20" x 25" was considered a realistic limit from
the visibility standpoint.]
(2) Hinges designed so that all hinged devices remain
as positioned by the crewman.
(3) Rounded edges and corners of packages and containers.
(4) Package fasteners able to withstand prelaunch,
launch, and flight loads and:
(a) Designed to prevent inadvertent operation.
(b) Simply operable with either a bare or a pres-
surized-gloved hand, without requiring extensive astronaut stability
aids. Skylab crews indicated a preference for magnetic or lift-handle
latches.
(5) Each package marked to indicate:
(a) Proper mounting orientation.
(b) Equipment-peculiar precautions.
(c) Operating instructions, where feasible.
(6) Cameras/film canisters, and other equipment trans-
ferred during EVA, designed to meet the following requirements:
(a) Capability for one-hand operation.
(b) Capability for tethering.
(c) Mounting provisions compatible with equipment
transfer devices.
(7) Package mounting provisions designed to avoid pro-
viding a space for floating articles to pass behind and/or accumulate.
3. Flight Operation Electrical Constraints
a. Module power provided to experiment interfaces had the
following characteristics:
(1) Two-Wire System. Power was distributed by a two-
wire system. The system did not use module structure for return of
current to the power source.
102
(2) Grounding. Any one set of negative buses was
referenced to the structure at only one point. The experiment could
not use module structure for return of current to the power source.
The module provided the single-point ground.
(3) Bonding. Electrical bonding and grounding of the
experiment was in accordance with MIL-B-5087, providing a radio fre-
quency ground reference plane, a fault current return path, and a
discharge path for lightning and static charge.
(4) Circuit Protection. All experiment positive
polarity lines of the DC distribution wiring were protected with
circuit breakers or fuses provided by the module. Use of fuses was
minimized.
(5) Crew Mating or Demating of Connectors On-Orbit.
The presence of power in the connectors during mating or demating by
the crew was circumvented by design or procedure. Connector design
or application precluded mismating.
(6) Characteristics of Unregulated 28 V DC Power at
Interfaces. The voltages at module interfaces met the following re-
quirements:
(a) Bus Noise. The total AC components of the
voltage could not exceed 1.0 volts peak-to-peak for all frequencies
from 20 Hz to 20 KHz.
(b) Under and Over Voltage. Under and over
voltage with a duration greater than 10 microseconis and less than
100 milliseconds could not exceed the limits 28 + 4 by more than 3
volts.
(c) Transients. Transient voltage with a dura-
tion of less than 1 microseconds could not exceed + 50 volts relative
to the limits 28 + .
b. The module provided interface cabling: 1) between
sensor and control panels, and 2) between experiment hardware com-
ponents if the cabling required mechanical support from the module.
c. Experiment electrical design considerations were:
(1) The experiment provided a rapid means of switch-
ing off power under emergency conditions.
(2) The experiment control panel provided a positive
indication of power-on, current level, and power-off status.
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(3) Experiment safety-critical and nonsafety-critical
circuitry were isolated from each other.
(4) Secondary power sources were provided for experiment
safety-critical functions.
(5) Experiment safety-critical electrical components
were protected against the effects of liquid leakage, moisture, con-
densation, vibration, arcing contacts and corona.
(6) Experiment electrical disconnects were located
separately from hazardous fluid disconnects, were qualified as ex-
plosion-proof and would not have power applied to the connection
during or after disconnect.
(7) If batteries were used, they were designed to
prevent danger of explosion under any conditions.
(8) Cabling was placed so that it could not be sub-
jected to loads for which it was not designed (e.g., use as a hand-
or foot-hold).
(9) Use of high-voltage systems was minimized.
d. The design of an experiment was required to satisfy
EMI criteria that met the following minimum requirements: the oper-
ation of the experiment in any mode (powered or unpowered) could not
degrade the performance of another subsystem relative to that sub-
system's performance criteria. The hardware would satisfy the single-
point ground requirement and meet EMI MIL-STD-461. Verification of
this was required during the qualification/development phase, and
evidence of meeting these criteria was included in the ADP.
e. Pyrotechnics
(1) Use of pyrotechnics by experiments was minimized
and required approval by NASA.
(2) Pyrotechnic initiators could not be susceptible
to ignition in the EMI environment of the module.
(3) The arming of pyrotechnic devices was protected
against accidental operation. Arming and safety were clearly indicated.
(4) Pyrotechnic exhaust products were contained or
controlled to prevent ignition of combustibles.
(5) The pyrotechnic logic circuits received power
from a source other than the pyrotechnic initiation batteries.
(6) Pyrotechnic devices required for safety were
designed to allow verification.
(7) Pyrotechnic firing circuits were protected from
electrostatic charge buildup.
(8) Sequence logic and pyrotechnic firing circuits were
required to be at least "fail-safe/fail-safe".
4. Flight Operation Controls and Displays Constraints
a. Circuit Protection. Circuit breaker devices had manual
reset capability and a visual display of position.
b. Panel Lighting. Console floodlighting, electrolumi-
nescent panel lighting, and numeric displays were controllable in
intensity steps at the panel or console. Lamp testing capability was
provided for panel displays. Radiation or luminescent type paint was
not allowed.
c. Emergency Lighting. The module provided the manual
or automatic emergency lighting of the work areas. This requirement
could be satisfied through the use of overhead emergency lighting.
d. Automatic/Manual Override. Controls and displays pro-
vided the capability for manual override of critical automatic systems
to assure mission success or crew safety.
e. Ground/Crew Operations. Experiment displays for ground
and crew controlled systems reflected true system status. [NOTE: Some
problems were encountered during the missions with inaccurate or un-
reliable film and magnetic tape usage indicators.]
f. Pyrotechnics Control. The flight crew was the sole source
of control of all pyrotechnic devices required for on-orbit operations.
g. Redundancy Control. Crew controls were provided for
selection of redundant system capabilities.
h. All controls and displays were recessed or provided with
"bump-proof" switch guards, especially for panels located in high-traffic
areas.
i. Operation of experiment controls was limited to one-man
operation, i.e., no single experiment operation required two crewmen
simultaneously.
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j. The crew monitored the progress of each experiment
observation and were provided the capability to terminate observation
due to lack of data quality.
k. Instruments provided automatic calibration, but pro-
vided crew capability to initiate a calibration procedure.
1. Where feasible (and not excessively time-consuming),
crew capability to perform a function effectively was utilized instead
of automating the function.
m. Experiments were designed to operate in a powered-down
mode during launch and reentry phases. If any experiment operation
was required dduring these phases, it was monitored and controlled from
the module.
5. Flight Operation Crew Interface Constraints.
a. To the maximum extent possible, crew mobility/stability
aids for experiments were preinstalled.
b. The crewmen were alerted to any existing or impending
crew hazard condition by an appropriate signal to the Caution and Warn-
ing System.
c. Attachment provisions for mounting the carry-in equip-
ment, instruments and devices, if any, were preinstalled in the module
prior to launch.
d. All launch-stowed experiment equipment was stowed such
that it could be obtained without EVA.
e. The module generally provided the following crew aids
and restraints:
(1) Provisions for locomotion and restraint were
located throughout the module to facilitate crew movement between
various work stations.
(2) Both permanent and portable general restraint
devices were provided, to allow the crew to adequately perform acti-
vities at the various crew stations.
(3) Adequate foot restraints were provided each crew-
man for use while performing normal or contingency tasks.
f. EVA tasks, including contingencies, could not require
more than two crewmen (i.e., at least one crewman remaining inside the
spacecraft at all times).
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g. A manual backup mode was provided for all mechanical,
EVA, and film magazine transfer devices.
h. EVA crew work stations at the experiment were illumi-
nated to 5 ft-lamberts minimum.
i. The module provided the capability to turn off all
external lights, either by crew or ground command, while performing
light-sensitive experiments.
j. Human Engineering. MSFC-STD-267 or MIL-STD-1472 were
applied as guides for standards and practices for Human Engineering
design.
6. Other Flight Operation Constraints
a. Fire, Toxicity, Radiation.
(1) Nonflammable structural materials were required
in the module environment. Interior walls and secondary structure
were constructed of self-extinguishing material.
(2) To the extent necessary to ensure crew safety,
materials selected for use in habitable areas were nonexplosive, non-
flammable, nontoxic, and low-outgassing under normal operational con-
ditions as well as under conditions of depressurization.
(3) Experiment radiation sources required NASA EDC
approval for usage.
b. Contamination Control
(1) Shields
(a) Contamination-sensitive elements were located
to take maximum advantage of natural shielding by the vehicle structure.
(b) Contamination-sensitive elements were shielded
from any direct impingement of the attitude control system or venting
contaminants, unless such shielding would be detrimental to the opera-
tion of the contamination-sensitive element.
(2) Covers.
(a) All optical instruments exposed to the external
environment were protected from contamination during non-data-taking
periods by movable covers over the instrument aperture.
(b) Instrument covers were designed so that the
most probable failure modes were in the open position. A backup
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activation mechanism to permit emergency cover opening was provided.
(c) Storage containers were provided for contami-
nant-sensitive experiments which were stowed in the module. Containers
were atmosphere-tight and capable of dry nitrogen purge or evacuation
after insertion of the experiment for storage.
(3) Material Selection. All materials used in con-
struction of experiment and module hardware were evaluated for out-
gassing and dusting characteristics. The following specifications
were applicable:
(a) Material Outgassing Control. Materials se-
lection conformed to the requirements of the program specifications
(e.g., 50M02442, ATM Material Control for Contamination Due to Out-
gassing).
(b) Material Dusting Control. All materials were
selected for minimum dusting, powdering, or flaking characteristics.
Where no acceptable material to perform the function was available,
covers or coatings were used to contain the dusting products, or other
protective means (such as filters) were provided for reduction of dust
products entering the cabin or external atmosphere.
(4) Wherever practical, mirrors, lenses, prisms,
windows and other instrument optical elements that were expected to
be degraded by contamination were designed so that they could be
periodically replaced by the crew with a spare element.
(5) Electric heaters on windows, lenses and mirrors
were used where practical to maintain the optical element at an ele-
vated temperature in order to prevent contaminant deposition, or to
periodically heat the optical element (window) to drive off accumu-
lated internal condensation.
(6) Photographic film was packaged in canisters to
reduce possible contamination effects prior to camera loading. Pre-
mission film testing revealed that certain film types (in particular,
Schulman types, non-overcoated) are susceptible to severe fogging in
the presence of non-anodized aluminum or copper; these materials should
be avoided in design of film storage containers.
(7) Venting and Dumping.
(a) Waste storage tanks were of adequate size
to allow a minimum of one orbit's accumulation between dumps. (The
design goal to store all liquid wastes for the entire operational
period was actually achieved.)
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(b) Waste vents were positioned as remotely as
possible from sensitive surfaces and were directed so that minimum
impingement occurred on any module components.
(c) Nozzle orifice design and discharge pressure
were chosen to provide the minimum practical cone angle pattern for
the discharge stream. Waste dribble at the beginning and end of a
dump was minimized.
(d) Solid waste was packaged and stored wherever
possible. If dumping was required, all solid waste was dumped into
the waste tank in packaged form. Dumps were timed to occur between
operations of critical experiments.
(8) To avoid contamination, dry lubrication was the
preferred method for mechanisms exposed to space.
7. Ground Operation Constraints for Flight Hardware.
a. General Constraints
(1) Experiments were installed in the module prior to
installation of the module on the launch vehicle.
(2) All subsystems included provisions for deactiva-
tion and monitoring required to assure personnel and hardware safety.
(3) The experiments were designed to allow integration,
checkout, operation, refurbishment and maintenance activities to be
performed in either horizontal or vertical position.
(4) All hardware was capable of satisfying and main-
taining Class 100,000 cleanliness as a minimum.
b. Mechanical Constraints
(1) Interface cables and fluid lines were of suffi-
cient length (service loop) to allow interface connections to be made
before mechanical mating of the experiment
(2) Interface fluid lines and electrical cables were
designed so that individual cables or lines could be removed without
disrupting the integrity of adjacent lines.
(3) Transportation and handling equipment was designed
to ensure that flight structures were not subjected to transportation
loads more severe than flight design conditions.
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(4) Design of the experiment minimized problems due to
moisture condensation and dripping.
(5) The design and routing of flight and GSE cables
and fluid lines was such that these cables and fluid lines would not
pose any obstruction to module egress or be subject to damage.
(6) Where possible in the design of the experiment,
consideration was given to using captive-type fasteners for internal
mounting of experiment components, to preclude loss of attachment
hardware.
(7) Experiment thermal control subsystems were designed
so that constant or periodic circulation of fluids was not required
during periods of power-down or storage, and to provide ease in the
servicing of fluids including fill, drain, and dry operations.
c. Electrical Constraints
(1) Instrumentation system capabilities and sensors
required to support ground test activities were included in the flight
hardware wherever practical, in order to minimize the requirements for
separate ground support equipment.
(2) Where feasible, pyrotechnic devices were category
B as defined in GP-469, Explosive Safety Handbook (i.e., "Category B
electric-explosive devices are those which will not, in themselves or
by initiating a chain of events, cause injury to people or damage to
property").
B. Ground Support Equipment
1. General
a. Onboard monitoring and control of those operations which
might be hazardous to ground test personnel were capable of being moni-
tored and controlled by GSE.
b. GSE required for support of ground testing, monitoring,
and servicing activities was minimized by making maximum use of the
flight subsystems to support these functions. GSE related to ground
servicing included provisions for external excitation voltage and
monitoring capability, to preclude the necessity of internal power-up
for these activities.
c. Development testing of GSE was required only when it was
impractical, impossible, hazardous or not cost-effective to rely solely
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on an engineering analysis or acceptance verification to establish func-
tional performance.
d. Qualfication testing was accomplished on an exception
basis only, for those items of GSE which could not be qualified by
analysis or similarity.
e. Experiment-specific GSE was provided by the ED. This
GSE was designed to interface with standardized facility support inter-
faces for power, fluids, etc.
f. The design of the GSE took into consideration the existing
facilities' capabilities at the module integration site, launch site,
and any other users' facilities, as applicable. Every effort was made
to provide identical sets of GSE for use at the various test locations.
g. Means were provided for controlled movement of hardware
that was not easily hand-manipulated (e.g., tracks, guides or other
restraining devices with spacing and friction controls), to minimize
the potential of damage to adjacent equipment and hazards to personnel.
h. The experiments were protected as necessary during all
handling operations.
i. Containers for transporting hazardous material had ade-
quate handles and lids and indicated when they were positively closed.
Also, easy-to-recognize markings identifying contents, information or
special handling notes were provided.
2. Design and Construction. GSE design adhered to known
state-of-the-art and to the selection of proven parts, materials, and
processes to the degree practical. The design was restricted to the
accomplishment of the GSE requirements.
a. Operation Periods. After adjustment, GSE was designed
to operate for a period commensurate with the function being performed,
without requiring readjustment of controls when set for specific opera-
ting conditions.
b. Redundant Electrical Circuits.- Redundant electrical
circuits in GSE were not routed through the same connector.
c. Operating Power. GSE was designed to be compatible
with the power existing at the facilities to be used.
d. Racks and Consoles. The design of subassembly racks
and consoles included entry access for cables and cooling systems that
were compatible with the facilities in which they were to be used.
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e. Fluid (Gas and Liquid). The GSE necessary to support
fluid systems transferred, conditioned and/or stored the fluid suit-
able for the ultimate system usage.
f. Cleanliness. GSE was designed, manufactured, assembled,
and handled in a manner such that its presence and/or operation in the
applicable clean areas and flight vehicles would not violate the clean-
liness levels maintained therein. In cases where GSE was used for the
transportation, handling or removal of experiments, the GSE was designed
to provide adequate means of contamination control consistent with the
cleanliness levels of the module involved.
g. Test Provisions. GSE was designed so that failure
within the GSE or interruption of power would not cause failure or
damage to the flight hardware being tested. Conversely, failure of
the flight hardware being tested could not cause failure or damage to
the GSE.
h. Single Point Failures. GSE was designed so that a
single point failure would not affect crew or ground personnel safety,
cause loss of flight hardware, prevent or compromise accomplishment of
a primary mission objective or cause a launch to be rescheduled.
i. Standard Parts. NASA, Air Force-Navy (AN), Military
Standard (MS) or joint Air Force-Navy (JAN) standard parts were used
in GSE wherever applicable.
J. Corrosion Prevention. Metals used in GSE were of the
corrosion-resistant type or suitably treated to resist any corrosive
conditions likely to be met in manufacture, assembly, testing, servic-
ing, storage or normal service use.
k. Electromagnetic Interference. Electrical and electronic
GSE was designed to perform as specified when operating either inde-
pendently or in conjunction with other equipment with which an elec-
trical connection was made, or which may have been installed nearby;
and would not, in itself, be a source of interference which might
adversely affect the operation of other equipment. GSE was designed
to meet the requirements and limits of MIL-STD-461. (Reference
MIL-STD-462).
1. Single Point Electrical Grounding. All units (racks,
consoles, enclosures) using or generating electrical energy were pro-
vided with an accessible and clearly marked ground stud for single
point grounding purposes. The DC resistance between any metal part
of the units (covers, lids, hinged doors, etc.) and the ground stud
could not be greater than 100 milliohms.
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3. Maintainability. Maintainability criteria for GSE were
specified to satisfy the following requirements:
a. Accessibility. GSE was designed to permit ease of
access to accomplish maintenance functions, i.e., inspection, servic-
ing, adjustment, calibration, or repair. Inspection, maintenance or
test locations were identified and easily accessible.
b. Disassembly Provisions. GSE was designed to permit
ready disconnection, removal and replacement of major assemblies or
components through use of modular construction design principles.
c. Environmental Requirements. GSE was capable of success-
fully performing the required functions during or after being subjected
to the natural and induced environments encountered during each of the
modes of transportation, handling, operation and storage.
d. Transportability. Wherever possible, GSE was designed
to withstand handling and transportation environments without the nec-
essity of special containers, or the necessity of monitoring critical
environments to verify that design limits had not been exceeded.
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EXPERIMENT TESTING
A. Development Phase
1. Requirements. Experiment hardware acceptance was contin-
gent upon prior verification that the end item would meet each technical
(performance, interface or design) requirement of the applicable EIS.
Verification could.be accomplished either by assessment or by test (or
a combination of the two). Commonly used assessment methods were:
o Similarity: Used when it could be shown that the
article was identical or substantially similar in
design, manufacturing processes, and quality con-
trol to another article that had previously been
qualified to equivalent or more stringent criteria.
o Analysis: Used in lieu of testing whenever it
could be shown by generally accepted analytical
techniques that an article would meet the appli-
cable technical requirements.
o Inspection: Used when it could be shown that
inspection techniques were adequate to assure
that the article would meet the applicable tech-
nical requirements. Inspection was used to veri-
fy construction features, compliance to drawings,
workmanship, and physical condition of the article.
o Demonstration: Used when it could be shown that
demonstration was adequate to assure that the
article would meet the applicable technical re-
quirements. Demonstration was used to verify
such requirements as service and access, handling,
convenience and ease of operation.
o Validation of Records: Used when it could be
shown that records would substantiate manufac-
Luring processes, materials, traceability, or
test history performance.
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For cases where assessment methods were not applicable, it was generally
necessary to accomplish verification by testing. Test programs were
designed to avoid duplication and to require only the minimum tests
necessary, subject to considerations of hardware criticality and com-
plexity. The influence of the hardware Criticality Category (see I
Section X)' was to emphasize verification by test for Category 1 hard-
ware, by combinations of test and assessment for Category 2, and by
assessment rather than test (where feasible) for Categories 3 and 4.
2. Test Types
a. Development Tests. Development tests, as necessary,
were performed to acquire data to support the design anddevelopment
process; to verify feasibility of the design approach by evaluating
hardware performance, design margins and/or failure modes under simu-
lated or actual environmental conditions; and to provide confidence in
the ability of the hardware to pass qualification tests by verifying
selected performance/design requirements. Hardware used for develop-
ment testing was representative of, but not necessarily identical to,
the flight experiment hardware. A Development Test Specification was
prepared by the ED for each development test and submitted for EDC
review. Test procedures and a report for each development test were
prepared by the ED and made available at appropriate development mile-
stones.
b. Qualification Tests. Qualification tests were per-
formed to verify that the design met the technical requirements of
the EIS, assuring operational suitability in the anticipated environ-
ments. Qualification test hardware was required to be identical in
configuration and production processing to the flight hardware. A
Qualification Test Specification and procedures were prepared by the
ED and submitted for EDC review. A formal report of qualification
test results was submitted for EDC approval at completion of the tests.
The qualification test program was to be scheduled such that there was
sufficient time to allow for possible failures, rework during testing,
and preparation, review and approval of the final test report, prior to
acceptance of the flight hardware.
General requirements for qualification testing were:
(1) Qualification tests were to be conducted at the
highest practical level of hardware assembly.
(2) If qualification tests were to be conducted on the
entire end item, then acceptance tests were conducted on qualification
test hardware prior to qualification tests being conducted.
(3) Sequence of the qualification tests followed the
same order in which the environments were to be encountered by the
flight hardware.
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(4) Tests to determine whether the qualification test
hardware was performing within specification tolerances were conducted
after each environmental exposure, and during the exposure period if
the flight hardware was required to operate in that environment.
(5) Qualification tests were performed under strict
control of environments and test procedures. Adjustment or tuning of
qualification test hardware was not permitted during tests unless it
was normal for in-service operation.
(6) Where redundancy in design existed, the qualifica-
tion tests assured that each redundancy was qualified.
(7) If the design configuration or manufacturing pro-
cesses were changed after acceptance tests on qualification test hard-
ware were initiated, any differences existing between the qualification
test hardware and the flight and backup hardware invalidated verifica-
tion and required repeating the qualification test.
(8) Qualification tests were to be completed prior
to the delivery of flight or backup hardware.
(9) Where considered necessary, components of qualifi-
cation test hardware were disassembled after testing was completed, and
inspected to determine margins of safety and potential failure modes.
(10) Types of Test Environments: Humidity; salt fog;
high temperature (1600F on Skylab); low temperature (-40 0F on Skylab);
shock; fungus; positive pressure (for hermetically sealed equipment);
acceleration; vibration (sinusoidal resonance search, sinusoidial
cycling, and random vibration); acoustic noise; altitude or space simu-
lation; and atmospheric compatibility (oxygen, nitrogen, or two-gas en-
vironment).
c. Acceptance Tests. Acceptance tests were conducted to
verify the performance and configuration of each experiment hardware
end item at the time of its acceptance by the Government or delivery
to another NASA center. The ED prepared (subject to EDC review) an
Acceptance Test Specification, defining the limits and methods for
each test, and Acceptance Test Procedures based on this specification.
Data sheets were prepared showing the results of all acceptance tests
performed.
General requirements for acceptance testing were:
(1) Environmental tests were included in acceptance
tests in instances where a type of manufacturing flaw could not be
detected by inspection or other nondestructive means.(e.g., conduct-
ing a vibration test on electronic equipment to find faulty solder
joints).
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(2) The severity, duration, and number of tests were
constrained so as not to result in overstressing or degradation of the
hardware performance capability.
(3) Where possible, all normal, alternate, redundant
and emergency operational modes were tested.
(4) The hardware was calibrated and aligned prior to
conducting acceptance tests.
(5) Acceptance tests were performed under strict con-
trol of environments and test procedures. Adjustment or tuning of
hardware was not permitted during acceptance testing unless it was
normal for in-service operation.
(6) Any repairs, modifications or replacements after
completion of acceptance tests required retesting to assure the accept-
ability of the change.
B. Integration Phase
1. Requirements. Integration tests were performed to verify
those interface requirements that could not be formally verified at
the individual experiment hardware level. General integration test
requirements were originally baselined in the ERD, including an ex-
periment hardware flow diagram from the ED through the module integra-
tion and launch sites, types of tests at each site and associated spe-
cial constraints. These requirements and constraints were later ampli-
fied and updated in the EITRS documents, which reflected concurrence
of all agencies involved (i.e., the ED, EDC, EIC, Module Development
Center and Contractor, as applicable). The Module Development Center/
Contractor then developed the detailed TCRSD, covering integration
testing at both module and launch sites. The TCRSDs contained detailed
requirements for each test, criteria for judging the success of the
test, and any special constraints. From these detailed requirements,
the site responsible for conducting the test prepared detailed test
procedures to satisfy each requirement. At module integration sites,
satisfaction of the requirements was a constraint on acceptance of the
module. At the launch site, satisfaction of the requirements was a
constraint on flight readiness.
2. Test Types. Normally, all of the following tests (as appli-
cable) were performed in the initial experiment integration at the module
site; ideally, only minimal integrated systems testing was performed on
experiments at the launch site. However, if it was necessary to remove
an experiment for calibration, maintenance or modification (or if its
interfaces were otherwise disturbed) at any time after module integra-
tion, all applicable integration tests had to be repeated prior to the
launch site integrated systems test.
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a. Receiving and Inspection (R&I). Whenever hardware
was delivered to a site, the equipment and its accompanying data pack-
age were inspected for completeness and any evidence of physical damage.
The hardware was not actually operated during R&I unless there was an
indication of physical damage during shipment.
b. Pre-Installation Tests (PIT). Following R&I, the hard-
ware was delivered to a clean room (normally class 100,000), where it
was set up and tested using experiment GSE. Testing was limited to
that needed either to verify that baseline calibration data remained
valid or to determine a new data baseline prior to mating the experiment
to the flight vehicle. This baseline data (collected either during the
PIT or during the earlier acceptance test at the ED site) was needed
prior to system testing on board the module for comparison with data
collected during the module system test, in order to determine the
effect of module environment (electrical, EMI, etc) upon the experiment.
c. Functional-Interface Verification Test (FIV). The objec-
tives of these tests were strictly limited to verification of all inter-
faces with the module. FIV began with verification of mechanical inter-
faces by mounting the experiment in the module. If installation of the
experiment involved a part of the module primary pressure structure, the
seal of the experiment was leak tested following installation. Following
mechanical installation in the module, polarity of the module power input
at the experiment interface was checked. A megger-ohm test was performed
upon the experiment prior to electrical mating, to verify that the ex-
periment hardware was properly isolated from the module and that experi-
ment input impedances met interface requirements. Using a "break-out
box" between the module power cable and the experiment power connector,
measured power was applied to the experiment and calculations were made
to verify the experiment power profile. Following these power checks,
the power connector was mated directly and the experiment was operated
under flight conditions (as far as practicality would permit) to verify
the remaining experiment electrical interfaces. All modes of the ex-
periment operation were not functioned unless an interface was involved
that would not be tested otherwise.
d. Integrated Systems Tests. Following successful comple-
tion of all interface verifications of individual experiments, integrated
system tests were conducted to verify that experiments and module systems
could play together without degradation of the performance of either.
These tests were characterized primarily as electromagnetic compatibili-
ty tests, and were performed utilizing existing flight plans and check-
lists, with flight crew participation, to the greatest extent possible.
The tests were evaluated by comparison of their data with baseline data
provided by the experiment acceptance and/or PIT tests.
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